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This paper focuses on the past, present, and future rules and regulations implementing CRA as
developed, applied, and enforced by the federal bank and thrift regulators. The past rules and
regulations refer to those in effect during the law’s first 18 years, through 1995, when CRA
underwent its first major reform. The present CRA rules and regulations were adopted then,
with the mandate that they would be reviewed for possible reform in 2002. The future rules and
regulations are being drafted now by the regulators, based on their review of approximately 400
public comments; the reform recommendations should be released sometime during the second
half of 2002.
The future of CRA’s legacy as arguably the perfect fair market regulation in a world of
Compassionate Capitalism will depend upon the direction of these reforms. Optimal public
policy by the bank and thrift regulators in this regard must represent the ideal balance between
competing consumer and industry interests. This paper represents the first comprehensive
analysis of the public comments and concludes with specific recommendations that will lead to
optimal public policy.1
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) is 25 years worth of living proof that
capitalism can have a corporate conscience without degrading itself into socialism or gambling
on the other extreme of completely unregulated markets.
CRA can be argued to be the nearly perfect example of striking the correct balance between
government and market regulation in a capitalist economy.  Too much regulation is as bad as
too much deregulation as we saw with the S&L crisis and most recently Enron.  Somewhere
between regulated and unregulated markets is the ideal point known as “fair” markets,
representing the optimum balance between consumer and industry interests.
CRA is arguably the perfect example of a fair market regulation for many reasons:
!  By providing access to credit for all, it gives everyone an equal chance at (but no guarantee
they will get) their share of the American Dream;
!  It is needs not race based, with the focus on the most needy low- and moderate-income
group;
!  It does not require banks to make bad loans or lose money;
!  While there is a reasonable compliance cost to banks, there is little to no cost to taxpayers,
who get something in return for federal subsidies to the banking industry;
!  The law, which has “politically correct” curb appeal, has more bark than bite in terms of
actual enforcement and is therefore not overly intrusive to business;
!  It relies more on the positive power of disclosure in the market than regulatory brute force;
and,
!  It is reformed periodically so that it remains responsive to both consumer and industry
interests.
This paper focuses on the past, present, and future rules and regulations implementing CRA as
developed, applied, and enforced by the federal bank and thrift regulators. The past rules and
regulations refer to those in effect during the law’s first 18 years, through 1995, when CRA
underwent its first major reform. The present CRA rules and regulations were adopted then,
with the mandate that they would be reviewed for possible reform in 2002. The future rules and
regulations are being drafted now by the regulators, based on their review of approximately 4002
public comments; the reform recommendations should be released sometime during the second
half of 2002.
The future of CRA’s legacy as arguably the perfect fair market regulation in a world of
Compassionate Capitalism will depend upon the direction of these reforms.   Optimal public
policy by the bank and thrift regulators in this regard must represent the ideal balance between
competing consumer and industry interests.  This paper represents the first comprehensive
analysis of the public comments, and concludes with specific recommendations that will lead to
optimal public policy.
CRA: THE PAST
The Credit Access Plight of the LMI Underclass
Just as everyone should have the right to apply to the college of his or her choice, so too should
there be the right to apply to a bank for a loan.  Whether or not someone is accepted by the
college or bank of their choice should depend on that person’s willingness and ability to meet
the requirements of the institution.
Students with good high school GPA and SAT scores, letters of recommendations, and other
desired characteristics deemed necessary to succeed as determined by the college will be
accepted.  If not by the student’s first choice then by the others applied to, even if it means the
“safety” or last choice college.
Likewise, loan applicants with a good credit score, letters of recommendations, and other
desired characteristics deemed necessary to repay the loan (i.e., the banker’s 6 “C’s” of credit
such as character, collateral, capacity to repay, etc.) should be approved.  Again, if not by the
applicant’s first and usually most convenient choice, then by the other banks applied to where
there may be additional direct and indirect costs.
This all sounds reasonable and fair, but this is not always the way things work in the real
world of academia OR banking.  Sometimes good college applicants are denied in favor of less
qualified ones such as a sought-after “jock,” a family member of a generous alum, or someone
with “connections.”  But, at least there was an opportunity to apply and a sense of hope after
submitting the application that you might get accepted by your dream school.
Despite the shortcomings of college application and acceptance procedures, they are an
infinite improvement over the comparable ones in banking, particularly for low- and3
moderate-income (LMI) individuals, especially first-time homebuyers and small business
entrepreneurs.
1
For far too long many people with LMI incomes OR living in LMI areas would not even feel
comfortable going into a bank, much less talking to an officer about an application.  Many who
did often were dissuaded from making an application, and those who persisted were realistic in
not being too hopeful for an approval, at least for the amount and terms desired.
The Government Responds With CRA
Aware of the credit access plight of the LMI underclass, the government created a crude lending
safety net in the form of FHA, VA, SBA, and other alphabet soup programs.
Additionally, there were, as there are today, always lenders of last resort for the more than
10% of Americans that are unbanked, such as family and friends, second-floor finance
companies, payday lenders, and even unregulated lenders and loan sharks.   Just as there is
always some matchbook cover or internet diploma mill where you can buy a degree, there is
always someone who will lend you money, even if it means going to Tony Soprano.
Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin believed that the LMI deserved the same opportunity to
access credit as their higher income counterparts.  He was particularly outraged that some LMI
communities in Chicago and elsewhere were being deprived of the lifeblood of bank credit
through “redlining.”  This referred to the practice of geographic (not racial) discrimination in the
granting of credit to qualified applicants in certain neighborhoods that were targeted or
“redlined.” 
2
Reasoning that all taxpayers, regardless of income, ultimately backstopped the FDIC and
our financial system through the Treasury, he shepherded through the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977 (CRA).
3
Senator Proxmire felt CRA would be a reasonable quid pro quo for the various federal
subsidies received by the banking and thrift industries, such as access to the payments
mechanism and below-market rate lending from the Federal Reserve System (FED).  By
                                           
1 LMI is defined to mean an income of 80% or less of the median, which would be  $40,000 or less in the
case of all U.S. families according to the 2000 Census.  This includes, by definition, about 40% of
American families.
2 Presumably these excluded neighborhoods were circumscribed by a red marker on a city map in a
bank’s board room.
3 An extensive literature exists on CRA; see, for example, Haag, 2000, and U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 2000.4
contrast, there is no CRA for Wal-Mart or McDonalds, as they don’t benefit from such federal
subsidies.
The CRA is elegantly simple: it encourages (not requires) federally insured banks and
thrifts to help meet the credit needs of their entire communities, including LMI neighborhoods,
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.
This means that everyone should have an equal opportunity to apply for and, if necessary,
be denied credit.  Access to credit, which can almost be argued to be in inalienable right, has no
guarantees other than a fair chance to be accepted or denied based on a bank’s underwriting
practices.
The banking industry, as expected, opposed this new law as a form of “credit allocation,”
but what was unexpected was the opposition of the FED.  Thus, began the Jekyll and Hyde bank
regulator that publicly put on a pro-CRA face but privately encouraged member banks to lobby
Congress to weaken the law.  This was a first for a federal bank regulator in modern times.
In passing the law, Congress determined that regulated financial institutions are required to
demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of their community,
which include the need for credit services as well as deposit services.
To ensure the continued and affirmative obligation of financial institutions, Congress
directed the bank and thrift regulators to periodically assess an institution’s record of meeting
community credit needs, and to consider that record when acting on deposit facility branch or
other expansion applications.  These regulators are the FED and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) as well as two agencies of the Department of Treasury, namely the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
This carrot and stick approach afforded community groups the possibility of holding up
branch, merger, and other expansion applications while they persuaded regulators to require
changes in a bank’s credit practices, sometimes resulting in grants to the protesting groups.
Opponents of CRA labeled such practices as nothing more than “legalized extortion.”
In the early years, there was no middle ground with CRA, as you were either with the banks
or with the community groups.  This, like almost everything else, changed over time.
The CRA Triangle
What quickly developed was a model of consumer, government, and business interaction known
as the “CRA Triangle” (Thomas 1993 and 1998).  As seen in Figure 1, there is an on-going and5
often volatile dynamic tension among the three elements or “corners” of the CRA Triangle:
1.  “C” – Community groups representing consumer interests;
2.  “R” – Regulators, influenced and monitored by Congress and the Administration,
representing the interests of the "public;" and,
3.  “A” – America's banks and thrifts subject to CRA (excluding credit unions) representing the
interests of their stockholders.
The isosceles form of the CRA Triangle in Figure 1 represents an ideally balanced and
proportioned model with three equal sides and angles where none is more important than
another.  Community groups and banks together form the base of the triangle, with regulators in
the middle position equidistant to both corners.
In this ideal model of the CRA Triangle the regulators act as impartial referees between
community groups and banks, attempting to fashion a “socially optimal” result benefiting both
parties.  The reference to “optimal” public policy in CRA reform is based on reaching the ideal
balancing point within this triangle perspective.
This policy ideal must consider the potential conflicts of interest, pressures, and other factors
impacting each of the corners of the CRA Triangle.  While it is normally assumed that each
corner will act in the best interests of its constituent group, this is not always the case.  It is
possible, for example, that conflicts of interest can exist at community groups being funded by
banks or even at friendly regulators interested in going to work for a bank.
CRA reform would certainly benefit if each of the triangle’s corners properly represented
their constituents’ interests, but this would mean avoiding the “Top Ten New CRA Mistakes”
for each of these corners as displayed in Figure 3 (Thomas, 1998).  These CRA mistakes are just
as relevant now as they were during the last CRA reform.
Even if each corner truly represented its constituents’ interest, there may be constraining
factors.  Just as banks are under stockholder and regulatory pressure, the regulators themselves
may be under congressional scrutiny, especially a financially struggling agency undergoing
budget cuts.  Community groups too can be the subject of congressional scrutiny which can
change the way they operate and obtain funding.
The continuous conflict and cooperation among the three corners of such a triangle
represents the dynamic tension keeping the triangle strong.  The simplicity and strength of a
triangle, which represented life in primitive art, is seen in many facets of our society.6
The best example is the triangle portraying the three branches of our government.  The
dynamic tension evident in the conflict and cooperation among the executive, legislative, and
judicial corners helps keeps our system going.  It works better sometimes than others, but the
checks and balances inherent in that government triangle assure us that the public interest is
considered from those three perspectives.
A system with only two participants, like a duopoly in industry, is more susceptible to
potential collusion, but such counterproductive activity is considerably more difficult with three
participants.
4
A triangle must have three corners and three sides, but they are not always equal.  The
“Friendly Regulator Hypothesis” (Thomas, 1993 and 1998) states that regulators have become
far too close to the banks they supposedly regulate.  Such “friendly regulators,” act more like
cheerleaders than impartial referees, promoting one team (i.e., the banking industry) over
another (i.e., consumers). 
5
Thomas (1993 and 1998) identifies the FED as the quintessential friendly regulator, and
Figure 2 depicts the resultant “FED-distorted” CRA Triangle.  This (scalene) triangle has the
friendly regulator cooperating quite closely with the banks, and both of these corners are
significantly isolated from consumer interests.  A similarly distorted triangle can exist when
community groups get too close to banks providing them funds.
Our government is not always the perfect model of how different positions are balanced in
the public interest.  For example, the Federal Aviation Administration apparently was based on
a presumed balanced position between the safety interests of the flying public and the business
interests of the airline industry.  Concerns that the agency was getting too chummy with the
industry after the 1996 Valujet catastrophe in the Everglades resulted in the elimination of this
dual role of industry regulator and promoter.
Just as the previously FAA–distorted airline triangle was restored to a more balanced model
in the public interest, there is hope that this too will be the case with the CRA Triangle as this
law is reformed this year.
                                           
4 This is based on the same logic of trying to preserve at least three major competitors in large markets
(Thomas, 1998).
5 It is interesting to note that the thrift and two of the three bank regulatory agencies are currently
directed by former bankers or bank attorneys, with the only exception being ex–Wall Streeter Alan
Greenspan of the FED.7
Implementing Rules and Regulations
The federal bank and thrift regulators, operating independently and jointly through the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), a “super regulator” of sorts, regularly
publish rules and regulations implementing CRA.  These include examination procedures,
periodic Questions and Answers (Q&As), and various other brochures and documents (several
of these are reproduced in Thomas, 1993 and 1998).
One of these documents is a performance evaluation (PE) format to be used by the
regulators during their CRA examinations.  The original PE was based on a laundry list of 12
assessment factors.
6
The first column of Table 1 titled “Old CRA Regulations” summarizes the key
implementing provisions of the law.  The first column of Table 2 titled “Old CRA” identifies
each of the assessment factors.  These 12 (or 13 counting the delineated community) assessment
factors were categorized by the regulators into five performance categories:
I.  Ascertainment of community credit needs
II.  Marketing and types of credit offered and extended
III.  Geographic distribution and record of opening and closing offices
IV.  Discrimination and other illegal credit practices
V.  Community development
Regulatory examiners, who periodically visited banks and thrifts, would review various
required documentation, including policy statements and lending records, to assign a CRA
rating.  Separate profiles were developed for each assessment factor and the overall rating.
Originally there were five numerical ratings similar to the regulatory safety and soundness
ratings, which ranged from the highest rating of 1 to the lowest rating of 5.  This is equivalent to
the standard student rating system used by schools of “A” through “F.”  While the three federal
banking regulators always considered a rating of 2 and above to be satisfactory or better, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the OTS predecessor) used a lower threshold of 3.
                                           
6 In reality there were 13 assessment factors, as institutions were also evaluated on the reasonableness of
the community which they delineated.8
CRA’s Watershed Year of 1989
Like a paper street that exists only a map, CRA was much the paper law during the first dozen
years of its existence.  Although the law was not meaningfully implemented until 1979, there
were more important concerns in Washington like the 1980 election and the back–to–back
1980–81 and 1981–82 recessions.
CRA ratings were being made, but there was little serious concern over them by bankers or
regulators.  Very rarely would there be a CRA protest, and even more rarely would there be a
CRA denial, although the first one was in April 1979.
While CRA lay dormant for most of the 80s during the Reagan and Bush administrations,
there was a revival of interest in CRA in 1989.  Rather than due to any change of heart by the
Bush administration, the interest in CRA was driven more by a change in the congressional
climate in the midst of the S&L scandal, the biggest and costliest financial debacle since the
Great Depression.
The year began with Chicago’s troubled Continental Illinois being the first big bank to have
an application denied on CRA grounds.  There were a record four CRA denials in 1989.  Also,
the FFIEC released more specific methods of compliance and CRA enforcement, partly in
response to Senate Banking Committee hearings critical of CRA enforcement.  The OTS
instituted a specialized compliance program in 1989, soon to be followed by the FDIC and OCC
in subsequent years.
The law took on real teeth that year when Congressman Joe Kennedy of Massachusetts
used the S&L bailout (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act) as
leverage to require that a bank’s CRA rating and a portion of its exam be made public beginning
on June 1, 1990.
The Positive Power of Public Disclosure
The disclosure of CRA ratings and a public portion of the exam was the first time any bank
rating or exam was ever opened to public scrutiny in this country.  This was a significant event
not just for CRA but a bold experiment in government disclosure.
This disclosure afforded researchers the first opportunity to see how examiners evaluated
and graded banks.  The first major analysis of these exams involved a systematic review of 250
PEs and ratings made public by the four federal bank and thrift regulators (Thomas, 1993).  This9
analysis advanced the Friendly Regulator Hypothesis and revealed a level of grade inflation that
even made Harvard look tough.
In a major policy move to accompany the public disclosure of ratings, the four regulators
switched from the five–tier, numerical, pre–disclosure system to a four–tier, descriptive or
narrative rating as follows:
1.  Outstanding
2.  Satisfactory
3.  Needs to Improve
4.  Substantial Noncompliance
The stated purpose for this switch was to prevent any possible confusion with the five–tier,
numerical safety and soundness rating.  While the likelihood of any such confusion was
probably remote, the real problem was that the compression of the ratings resulted in a
significant loss of the richness of the data.
Regulators and consumers, and indeed the bankers themselves, could no longer distinguish
between “good” or High Satisfactory “B” performance and just–passing, average “C”
performance.  Ultimately, 80% or more of banks would be pushed into the massive
“satisfactory” range, which encourages many banks to make such “satisficing” their CRA
objective.
Even before CRA ratings were to be made public, just the prospect that they would be
disclosed had an apparent impact on regulators with an increase in the proportion of below–
average ratings and a decrease in the percentage of above–average ones.  The proportion of
banks with below average ratings for the first 18 months ratings were made public reached its
highest level ever (11%) and was over three times the comparable pre–disclosure average level
(Thomas, 1993).
Even with this somewhat tougher grading policy, only a tiny fraction of banks with below–
average ratings had their branch or merger plans disrupted.  CRA enforcement was an
oxymoron, as there were only 11 CRA denials of more than 50,000 branch and merger
applications from 1977 to 1989; by 1996, there were just 31 denials out of nearly 105,000
applications (Thomas, 1998).10
Pro–CRA congressional Democrats strengthened CRA even more by adding 1991
amendments requiring better documentation of a bank’s performance and rating in the public
PE.  Congressional amendments in following years strengthened CRA even more.  The 1992
election of Bill Clinton, who was publicly committed to community reinvestment, was a major
victory for CRA.
CRA was the proverbial law without teeth, with one very important exception.  The public
disclosure of the names and exams of banks with failing CRA ratings apparently was more
damaging than any action taken by the friendly regulators.  CRA quickly became the most hated
law in banking.
CRA: THE PRESENT
The Need for Reform
The new disclosure requirements put CRA on the radar of not only regulators but also the
media.  Banks and thrifts consequently began to take the law seriously.  Independent
researchers, citing increasing evidence of lending bias and “redlining,” called for a strengthened
and reinvigorated CRA as well as other community development agents, such as a network of
community development banks (see, for example, Papadimitriou, Phillips, and Wray, 1993).
The industry and community groups both complained about overly subjective CRA exams
and ratings that emphasized paper documentation and process over actual lending performance.
Community groups argued that there was grade inflation, and bankers countered that the
compliance burden was excessive.  The regulators, caught in a no–win situation, were
themselves unhappy with the exam and rating system.  No one cared when the exams and
ratings were confidential, but all of this changed with the new disclosures.
All corners of the CRA Triangle agreed that a reform was in order to make the law more
effective and efficient, and on July 15, 1993 President Clinton called for the first major reform
of CRA.  The stated goals of the reform were to:
1.  Promote consistency and evenhandedness in CRA enforcement
2.  Improve public CRA performance evaluations
3.  Implement more effective sanctions
4.  Develop more objective, performance–based CRA assessment standards11
The 1993–95 CRA Reform Process
What was to have been a one–time reform became a controversial process with three different
versions spanning three years.   Table 1 compares the major provisions of these versions of the
“new” CRA to the “old” CRA.
The first December 1993 proposal, which was aggressively pro–consumer, resulted in over
6,700 comment letters.  While everyone expected conflicts between the community and industry
positions, no one expected the publicized infighting by the regulators themselves, specifically
between the pro–CRA OCC and the generally perceived anti–CRA FED.
Members of the FED’s Board of Governors publicly criticized the 1993 proposal, which was
mainly drafted by OCC Comptroller Gene Ludwig, a Bill Clinton classmate.   FED governor
Larry Lindsay stated that he was “perfectly willing to tear it up, throw it into the fireplace, and
go back and start again” (Cummins, 1993).
Other FED governors condemned the proposal as the “wrong” approach and a “fundamental
policy mistake” resulting in not only credit but also “resource allocation.”   In addition to
concluding that “the time to say no is now,” one governor publicly stated that the FED would
oppose the proposal if bankers complained loudly enough!  Even the presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks piled on criticism, with the banker–friendly San Francisco FED arguing against
the disclosure of CRA public examination schedules.
The FED, with the help of the banking lobby, which it called to action, was successful in
watering down many of the toughest provisions of the 1993 proposal.  The OCC was not happy
but went back to the drawing boards.  The result was the September 1994 proposal that
proceeded to generate over 7,200 comments.  It was decidedly less pro–consumer, but this was
also a sign of the shifting political and even regulatory sentiment.
First, there was a much stronger than expected negative reaction by the industry to a
Department of Justice (DOJ) August 1994 fair lending suit against Maryland’s Chevy Chase
Bank and its affiliated mortgage company.  This was followed by a September 1994 conflict
between the FED and the DOJ over a fair–lending investigation at Florida’s Barnett Banks.
A defining political moment during the last decade was the November 1994 Republican
sweep of Congress.   It is not insignificant that the chairman of the National Republican
Senatorial Committee who led the successful effort to restore a Republican majority in the
Senate was Texas Senator Phil Gramm (see following discussion).12
Part of the Republican’s “Contract with America” dealt with reducing unnecessary and
burdensome government regulations, and anti–CRA advocates used this as further momentum
against pro–CRA reforms.  The following month, December 1994, witnessed a major DOJ
decision limiting CRA enforcement efforts that had a similarly chilling effect on pro–consumer
CRA reforms.
The end result of approximately 14,000 comment letters (on average more than one for
every bank and thrift) and seven public hearings was the third and final May 1995 “new” CRA
regulations.   The banking lobby, with the strategic help of the FED, won almost every CRA
reform battle it fought.  These regulations, which went into effect starting in 1996, are the ones
under which we have been operating since that time.
The “New” CRA
The final column in Table 1 summarizes the major implementing provisions of the “new” CRA.
Table 2 details specific performance standards and tests under the new CRA.
The most important change in the new CRA was a more performance–based exam and
rating system.  The previous “one–size–fits all” old CRA regs were replaced with four tests
based on an institution’s size and business strategy (see Table 2 for details):
1.   Small bank test (independent institutions with $250 million or less in assets or affiliated with
$1 billion or less holding company)
This streamlined test is based on four specific lending ratios with optional Investment and
Service Tests to upgrade a Satisfactory rating to an Outstanding one.  Each of the four ratios
has only three possible performance levels for a total of 12 cells in the Small Bank
Performance Ratings Matrix.
7
2.  Large retail bank test (for retail banks beyond the “small” definition)
This is, by far, the toughest CRA test and includes three component tests each with three to
seven performance factors.  This is the only new CRA test with five possible ratings
                                           
7 A fifth possible criterion is the “response to complaints,” but this is rarely rated because of the very low
incidence of filed complaints.13
(including High Satisfactory) for the component tests, but four possible overall ratings
(excluding High Satisfactory).   The combined three tests have 70 different cells in their
respective performance ratings matrices.   The three tests with their component weightings
for the overall rating as well as the number of component performance factors (see Table 2)
in each test are as follows:
a) Lending Test (50% weighting) with seven performance factors times five possible
ratings for 35 cells in the Lending Test Performance Ratings Matrix
b)  Investment Test (25% weighting) with three performance factors times five possible
ratings for 15 cells in the Investment Test Performance Ratings Matrix
c)  Service Test (25% weighting) with four performance factors times five possible ratings
for 20 cells in the Service Test Performance Ratings Matrix
3.  Wholesale and limited–purpose community development (CD) test (for special purpose
banks)
This is a streamlined and subjective test allowing banks a choice of being evaluated under
CD lending, CD investments, and/or CD services.  With only four possible ratings (no High
Satisfactory) and three performance factors, there are only 12 cells in the CD Test
Performance Rating Matrix.
4.  Strategic plan test (for any bank as a matter of choice)
All institutions have the option of being evaluated under this test where banks propose their
own lending, investment, or service performance standards upon which they are evaluated
for one of four possible ratings.  Very few banks have chosen this option for a number of
reasons, including the fact that regulators often raise the bar as to the level of lending
performance required to obtain certain ratings (often viewed as “credit allocation”).14
New Problems with the New CRA
Regardless of which test is used by a bank, each institution is evaluated relative to its
“performance context,” which includes such factors as business strategy and constraints as well
as community needs and opportunities.  This performance context can sometimes be used,
however, as a regulatory crutch for a subjective and especially inflated rating.
Large retail institutions not only have the burden of the toughest test under the new CRA but
also have additional data requirements regarding small business, small farm, and community
development loans.
More important is the fact that the three–part test reduces the role of LMI lending to just
50% of the total rating, with the new Investment and Service Tests accounting for 25% each.
This was a major change in and a bold experiment with this traditional LMI lending law.
Besides watering down the original LMI lending purpose of CRA, this three-part test for big
banks proved both costly and problematic, as there was and continues to remain a shortage of
suitable CRA investments with acceptable returns.  Many examiners responded by inflating the
Investment Test rating to allow a bank to receive an overall passing rating.  Thus, this test and to
a lesser extent the Service Test became a key source of grade inflation.
Wall Street carpetbaggers immediately capitalized on the shortage of qualified investments
by creating an entire “CRA investment” industry comprised of mutual funds and other
investment vehicles for desperate banks.  Many of these investment credits, however, do little to
help LMI people or neighborhoods, as one LMI securitized loan, for example, might be
repeatedly flipped so several banks get Investment Test credit.
There are other questionable qualified investments that may have little to no relationship to
LMI lending.  For example, the mere purchasing of no–risk CDs in minority banks, the
definition of which was recently expanded, is considered a qualified investment.  However,
some minority banks merely invest the funds in government securities rather than convert them
to LMI loans as presumed by the CRA regs.  Also, outright grants to community groups are
considered qualified investments, an important but rarely mentioned reason why they apparently
have defended the Investment Test.
Grade Inflation
The subject of CRA grade inflation is discussed elsewhere in more detail (Thomas, 2000).  One
of the important conclusions of such research is that anyone can allege grade inflation, just like15
anyone can file a lawsuit.  But, proving the case is an entirely different matter and requires
considerable analysis.
A simple or even complex comparison of overall or individual test ratings among different
groups does not prove anything but differences that may exist among them for different reasons.
The only sound grade inflation methodology requires a case–by–case analysis of each bank, its
public PE, and considerable other publicly available data for it.  This means an entire re–
examination, without some of the data and resources available to an examiner, but still enough
to reach key performance rating conclusions.
Thomas (1998) reviewed over 1,407 small bank exams and ratings under the new CRA in
this manner and found that nearly half of them (47.1%) were inflated.  Significant grade
inflation was also found in the large retail bank exam, especially in the Investment Test, as well
as in the community development exam for special purpose banks.
A recent study attempted to make grade inflation conclusions about the Service Test
(Stegman, Thompson, and Faris, 2001).  This study was attached to the October 8, 2001 CRA
reform comment of the director of the Center for Community Capitalism of the University of
North Carolina (UNC).
This UNC study, however, reached its grade inflation findings based on a statistical
comparison of CRA component test ratings for many exams, making certain assumptions as to
desired overall ratings based on component ones.
This type of macro–analysis demonstrates considerable differences in component and
overall ratings.  By contrast, a comprehensive micro–analysis of re–examining performance data
on each Service Test rating factor for each individual PE on a bank–by–bank basis is required to
prove grade inflation (or deflation).
The UNC study’s authors realized this problem: “Because performance data on the six
individual service test criteria must be compiled by hand and are discussed and reported
inconsistently in CRA Public Evaluation reports, a statistical analysis comparing the borderline
banks to the larger population would be extremely difficult” (Stegman, Thompson, and Faris,
2001).  They later noted: “Again, because performance data must be compiled by hand and
because many examination reports do not provide full and consistent statistics on all six service
test criteria, a statistical analysis was not feasible.”
Such a statistical analysis, while extremely difficult to do by hand, is in fact feasible and was
conducted not just for the Service Test but all other tests and all types of exams (Thomas, 1998).16
The common and inescapable thread throughout that analysis is grade inflation.
The CRA Anti–Christ
There would be no CRA without Wisconsin Senator Proxmire.  Some two decades later Texas
Senator Phil Gramm did everything within his power to gut CRA.  To the extent that Senator
Proxmire was the equivalent of a “CRA Christ,” Senator Gramm was nothing less than the
“CRA anti-Christ.”
This ex–professor from Texas A&M University holds a Ph.D. in economics.  He first won
election to Congress as a Democrat but then switched to the Republican party.  Despite a failed
attempt at the presidency, Senator Gramm established a serious power base after successfully
restoring a Republican majority to the Senate in 1994.
Once he became chairman of the powerful Senate Banking Committee, Senator Gramm did
more to weaken CRA than anyone in Washington during the last quarter century.  Previously
identified Congressional “enemies of CRA,” (Thomas, 1998) such as Senators Mack (FL) and
Shelby (AL) and Representatives Bereuter (NE) and McCollum (FL) were amateurs compared
to the professional CRA “hit man” Gramm.
His anti–CRA emotions were so strong that he risked killing his own landmark financial
reform law, one of the most significant pieces of financial legislation in more than 50 years,
unless he could extract some CRA flesh.  The battle over financial reform in 1998 and 1999,
which culminated in the passage of the 1999 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLB), appeared to be
centered more around CRA than the underlying financial reform issues involving the repeal of
the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933.
Under the biggest seige of its life, CRA would have been eliminated without the most
powerful people in Washington, led by none other than President Clinton, coming to its rescue.
Even Rev. Jesse Jackson came to the defense of CRA, and it became a most divisive and heated
issue in Washington.
While some community groups like to take credit for “saving CRA,” it was their actions in
the first place that apparently motivated Senator Gramm to pursue his unprecedented CRA
witch hunt.  He was particularly concerned with the increasingly powerful community groups
and their lucrative financial relationships with banks.
As stated in his personal correspondence to the President (Gramm, 1999):17
“What’s not at issue is the [CRA making] capital available to people in the
communities...What is at issue is an unsavory practice in which protestors file
official complaints under CRA regulations and pursue them until they are paid by
the banks to stop protesting.  They will go away, but only after getting everything
from cash contributions to salaries as ‘advisors.’  That’s extortion, and its wrong…I
hope you will join me in the effort to make it illegal to give or receive cash in
connection with a CRA complaint.”
One of Senator Gramm’s favorite examples of such alleged abuses was a 1994 deal where
Fleet Financial paid the Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of America, which is headed by CRA
activist extraordinaire Bruce Marks, 2.75% of $140 million of loans (or $3.9 million) in addition
to “start–up” costs of $200,000 (Gigot, 1999).
Community groups fired back at the Senator.  In one well–publicized case several hundred
members of the Chicago–based National People’s Action descended on his residence on a
Sunday morning with banners, leaflets, and an effigy of the Senator (Barancik, 1999).  We
would learn later that this protest (while he was at home) and especially his trampled flowers,
seemed to make him more determined than ever to attack CRA.
Various versions of his financial reform attacked CRA in different ways.  One reform bill
passed the Senate with an unprecedented CRA exemption for nonmetropolitan banks with assets
of $100 million or less.  Presidential vetoes were threatened over that and other anti–CRA
provisions.
GLB finally became law on November 12, 999 and revamped our financial system by
allowing financial holding companies to expand beyond normal banking activities to the
insurance and securities businesses.
Despite all of Senator Gramm’s anti-CRA bark, the only bite he was able to muster in the
passed version of GLB was a significant reduction in the frequency of CRA exams and a
controversial “sunshine” requirement that required community groups to disclose how much
they got from banks.  Considering that banks and members of Congress must disclose the source
of their funds, this requirement was not unreasonable, as a few community groups and their
leaders might have other priorities (see following section).
CRA’s arch–enemy announced his retirement in 2001, the first year filings on sunshine
contributions became available.  Senator Gramm’s legacy will likely be shaped not just by GLB
but by the controversy over contributions… not from banks to community groups, but from the
failed Enron Corporation to Senator Gramm and his wife, Wendy, an Enron Director and former18
Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  Hopefully, the same sun that brought
light to bank funding of community groups will shine on Enron’s funding of the Gramms.
A Decade of CRA Ratings
CRA ratings began the last decade under the “10–80–10” rule: roughly 10% above– and below–
average ratings with the remaining 80% in the middle (i.e., “Satisfactory).   Published CRA
ratings data over this period (Thomas, 1993 and 1998) were updated by the federal regulators
and their web sites for the analysis in this section.
According to these data, the proportion of below–average or “failing” ratings, which was
just above 10% at the beginning of the last decade, fell to 2% by mid–decade, and remained in
that range for the remainder of the decade.  The most recent data for 2001 show this proportion
inching up slightly to the 3% range in 2001, which means the probability of a CRA examiner
giving a failing rating is not that different from the probability of a Wall Street stock analyst
giving a “sell” rating.
The proportion of above–average ratings also starting out at just above 10% in 1990,
peaked at about 27% in 1996 and then dropped back to about 15% in 2000 and to just above
10% in 2001.  Thus, the proportion of Outstanding ratings in 2001 was roughly where it was in
1990, having peaked in 1996.
It can be argued that the transition to the “new” CRA in 1996 was responsible for the more
than halving of above–average ratings by 2001 and the slight increase in below–average ratings.
This would, however, be over–simplistic, as there are other relevant explanatory factors that
likely played a role in these trends.
8  Grade inflation (or deflation) cannot be proved by looking
at ratings alone.
One of the most significant developments regarding CRA exams during the last decade was
the major cutback in the number of them.  The total number of CRA exams during the first part
of the decade averaged around 5,600, with 1993 being the peak year with about 6,700 exams.
With the new CRA being transitioned in during 1996, the number of exams fell to just under
5,000.  The number of exams continued to decline to the 4,000 range for both 1997 and 1998
before dropping even more to about 3,500 in 1999.  There was an increasing level of bank
consolidation during this period causing the total number of banks and thrifts (and exams) to
                                           
8 Examiners may have become “tougher” or perhaps bank CRA performance as measured under the new
standards was lower; or, more than likely, it was a combination of several factors.19
continue to dwindle.
The 1999 GLB mandated a change of CRA exam schedules resulting in considerably fewer
exams.  This 1999 law caused the number of CRA exams to precipitously drop by more than
one half from around 3,500 in 1999 to about 1,600 in 2000.  This trend continued with the
number of exams plunging even further to less than 900 in 2001.  Obviously, fewer exams not
only mean that fewer examiners are needed but also that CRA performance is being monitored
less frequently.
CRA Urban Legends
An entire CRA folklore has been developed, especially during the last decade.  Most of the
CRA urban legends were started by bankers (and even some anti–CRA regulators and
congressman like Senator Gramm) who opposed the law regardless of its costs or benefits.
One urban legend of recent vintage is that CRA has not worked.  In other words, it really
has not had a meaningful impact on the designated LMI target group.  The fact is that the
proportion of conventional home purchase loans to LMI borrowers (regardless of area) jumped
from 14.4% in 1990 to 25.4% in 2000, while the proportion made in LMI areas (regardless of
income) grew from 10.7% to 12.2% over the same period (FFIEC, 2002).  While it is difficult to
prove a causal relationship between CRA and these improved LMI numbers, it is reasonable to
assume as much with the very significant and visible push toward LMI lending.
A Treasury study on the impact of GLB on CRA concluded that CRA has had a favorable
impact on LMI home lending and that CRA lenders and their affiliates increased their LMI
lending faster than independent non–bank lenders.  That same study found that CRA has made a
substantial difference in the behavior of lenders and credit flows in LMI areas (Treasury, 2001).
A separate study by Harvard University concluded that CRA–regulated entities originated
significantly more LMI loans than they would have without CRA (Harvard University, 2002).
If not by any other standard, CRA was a success based on the $1.6 trillion dollars of written
CRA agreements for loans or commitments that were made by financial institutions (NCRC,
2002A).  To the surprise of both banks and even their doubting regulators, the results from CRA
lending were much better than expected.
It is no doubt easier and more efficient to make a single $1 million loan over a golf outing
at the country club compared to 10 LMI home loans of $100,000.  The latter, however, results in20
greater diversification and many times even a stronger credit, as an LMI family will do just
about anything, including taking on an additional job, to keep current on mortgage payments.
Wall Street later discovered an even better secret about these LMI loans: they are much less
likely to prepay or refinance when rates drop.  This makes the loans even more valuable since
they are being carried at a higher rate.  Companies like Bear Stearns became leaders in
packaging securitized CRA loans, which now represent a major sector of the secondary market.
Godzilla banks like JPMorgan Chase, having been burnt badly by lending heavily to big
borrowers like Enron and Argentina, probably now wish they would have made more LMI loans
in their local communities.
CRA has never caused a bank to fail or lose significant market cap.  In fact, two studies by
the FED made several very positive conclusions about CRA loans, thus dispelling the CRA
urban legend that such loans are unprofitable.
A 1997 FED study, for example, found that among banks specializing in mortgages, “we
find no evidence of lower profitability at commercial banks that specialize in home purchase
lending in lower–income neighborhoods or to lower–income borrowers” (Canner and Passmore,
1997).
The study went on to state that for the 1993–95 period of high CRA–related lending, ”the
profitability of banks seems unrelated to, or perhaps slightly positively related to, the proportion
of lending they extend in lower–income tracts.”  The most comprehensive study on the
profitability of CRA–related lending, which likewise reaches many favorable conclusions, was
also done by the FED.  That study is discussed in greater detail in the following section.
Another CRA urban legend is that the law’s main benefactors are minorities, particularly
African Americans and inner city communities.  Since CRA is an LMI income-based law, there
is no race card, which explains why this 1977 law has supporters on both sides of the aisle.  In
fact, 60% of LMI individuals are non–Hispanic white (Thomas, 1998).  While affirmative action
laws or programs may impact some college applications, this is not the case with CRA loan
applications.
A final CRA urban legend is that compliance with the law is very costly to banks.  While
this may have been somewhat true in the early 90s, the situation greatly improved for most
banks with the law’s 1995 reform.  A Treasury study concluded that the GLB reporting
requirements were expected to lead to “modesty higher compliance costs” (Treasury, 2001).21
Still, though, there is room for improvement, and this is one of the goals of the public policy
recommendations in this Working Paper.
The FED’s Study on the Profitability of CRA–Related Lending
As part of GLB, Congress asked the FED to conduct a comprehensive study of CRA loan
profitability (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000 and summary in
Avery, Bostic, and Canner, 2000).  This study was based on 143 responses to surveys sent to the
500 largest financial institutions (a 29% response rate).
The survey focused on four loan products representing $712 billion in estimated 1999
originations by the 500 surveyed financial institutions.  Roughly 18% of all originations or
$130.1 billion were CRA–related.  The breakdown of 1999 total and CRA–related originations















Home Improvement 12.0 2.2 18




Total Loans $712.0 $130.1 18
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Virtually all of the 500 largest financial institutions are $1 billion or larger in asset size.
The FED estimated that the 500 largest financial institutions accounted for roughly three–
fourths of all CRA–related lending in 1999, with the respondents representing about half of all
such lending.  These results are therefore quite representative of CRA–related lending.
The authors concluded that “…overall as well as CRA–related home purchase and
refinance lending is profitable or marginally profitable for most institutions.”  While the results
for home improvement lending were similar to the first category, “Nearly all respondents
reported that small business lending overall and CRA–related small business lending are both22
profitable.”  Regarding the last category, “Virtually all respondents reported that community
development lending is at least marginally profitable.” Also, two–thirds of the FED survey
respondents said that their CRA–related lending “has led to new business opportunities.”
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The profitability experience of small business lending is identical for those portions that are
CRA–related and those that are not.  This is a significant finding because this is the largest
single category of CRA–related lending, accounting for about 45% of it. Counting CD lending,
all of which is CRA–related, we can conclude from this FED study that over half (55%) of all
CRA–related lending has general profitability characteristics identical to all other bank lending
that is not CRA–related.  This is an important finding helping to dispel the myth that CRA–
related lending is unprofitable.
The remainder (45%) of CRA–related lending is home–related.  This general category can
also be viewed quite favorably, with between 82 and 86% of it being considered profitable or
marginally profitable.  The most significant differences in profitability clearly are in the home
purchase/refinance and improvement categories, where the proportion of CRA–related lending
that is unprofitable or marginally so is in the 10–15% range compared to the 2–4% range for23
lending that is not CRA–related (see table above).
Additional delinquency rate and other data in the FED survey support the general finding
that while the vast majority (i.e., 82–96%) of CRA–related lending is profitable or marginally
profitable, it falls short in this regard compared to lending that is not CRA–related.  Also, that
portion of the survey related to the roughly $11 billion in CRA special lending programs found
about 25% of them were unprofitable or marginally so.
Senator Phil Gramm of Texas immediately seized upon these results to argue that the FED
report “largely refutes the argument that CRA lending is good business for banks and the
American credit market” (Gramm, Phil, 2000).  By arguing that the surveyed loans would not
have been made without CRA, Senator Gramm ironically made one of the strongest arguments
in support of CRA, namely that this law is needed to encourage banks to make credit available
to LMI people and neighborhoods.
The fact is that without CRA, much of this 40% of our population would be facing a much
more difficult time accessing credit for home lending and improvement, small businesses, and
community development.
CRA Sunshine
Despite Senator Gramm’s continued CRA onslaught, the only anti–CRA provisions he could
pass in GLB was a reduction in the frequency of CRA exams and a controversial “sunshine”
requirement.
Community groups were unsuccessful in their vehement fight against this requirement.
The CRA sunshine provision requires community groups to disclose how much they got from
which banks.  Non–governmental entities or persons as well as insured depository institutions
and their affiliates that are parties to certain CRA agreements must make them public and file
annual reports about them with the regulators.
The sunshine rule only applies to written, CRA–related agreements preceded by a
(favorable or unfavorable) CRA communication.  A covered loan agreement must be for at least
$50,000, while a non–loan agreement, such as a grant, must be at least $10,000 to be reportable.
The regulators have made limited sunshine data available, and the only way to access it at
this time is via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to individual regulators.
9  The
                                           
9 One of the recommendations in this brief is that all CRA sunshine reports be made available on–line at
the regulatory web sites.24
author made a series of FOIA requests to the four federal bank and thrift regulators on October
21, 2001, but the responses were not all received until mid–December.
Table 3 reports a sampling of the first such publicly available group of sunshine reports
from the OCC.  This table summarizes filings of $100,000 or more to selected community
groups by some of the largest national banks for the 2001 reporting cycle.  This listing does not
include multi–million dollar loan agreements.  As can be seen from this tabulation, several
prominent community groups receive sizable funds from large banks around the country.
CRA Sunshine Clouded
The author’s requests to all four regulators did not reveal some CRA agreements between
community groups and bank related firms as they were apparently exempt under the new law.
Depository institution “affiliates” are limited to firms that were considered in recent CRA
exams.  Thus, community groups do not have to report agreements or grants, some of which
may be substantial, received from non–covered affiliates or other for–profit firms who supply
CRA services or products to banks.
A community group or financial institution may interpret a particular agreement’s nature or
even the relevant CRA communication to be exempt from filing requirements.  Some
community groups or institutions may even structure their agreements so that they are exempt
from CRA sunshine reporting.   Alternatively, a community group may state that it does not take
any funds for operating support from financial institutions, but makes an exception for the
sponsorships of conferences (where it is possible the funds are commingled for other uses).
Even if a community group involved in CRA is somehow exempt from sunshine filing, all
non–profits are required to make public their IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt
From Income Tax.  While these IRS forms are available at no charge on the internet (e.g.,
www.guidestar.org), the community groups are not required to list their contributors by name,
as would be the case with a CRA sunshine report.
Upon receipt of the FOIA–requested sunshine reports from the four regulators, the most
glaring omission was the lack of any filing for the Washington D.C. based National Community
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC).  They are the nation’s most vocal CRA coalition, with 800
member organizations from around the country according to their October 2, 2001 CRA reform
comment.  Each of the regulators independently confirmed that there were no CRA sunshine25
filings by NCRC.
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NCRC led the battle against Senator Gramm’s sunshine provisions, and provides advice to
its members on complying with sunshine requirements.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that they are operating under some type of filing exemption.  But, it is likewise reasonable to
expect that NCRC should disclose the specific sources of all of its funding, as this organization
is so central to the CRA reform debate.
11
The only public information readily available on the finances of NCRC is their IRS Form
990, which was obtained from the above–mentioned site.  Schedule B of that form for 2000 lists
19 individual contributors ranging from $5,000 to $100,000 each for a total of $507,000 (IRS,
2000).  Unfortunately, all of the contributor’s names, presumably financial institutions for the
most part, were deleted.
A statement to Schedule A of that form showing contributions over the 1996–99 period
ranging from $130,000 to $290,000 each for a total of $1.84 million for six major contributors
likewise did not identify the name of the contributors.  Thus, as many as 25 contributor’s names
were redacted in their Form 990.
Considering that NCRC has and continues to make demands on financial institutions (and
the regulators) for different types of data disclosure, they and similar CRA community groups
that are apparently exempt from sunshine filing, should voluntarily disclose the sources of its
contributions on this form.  This could be done as a voluntary sunshine filing with the regulators
or at least on their own web sites.
12
While the apparent exemption of this or similar community groups may meet the letter of
the sunshine law, it clearly does not meet its intent.  Sunshine in this corner of the CRA Triangle
would allow for more informed public policy debate and decisions.
                                           
10 Possibly due to differing interpretations of the CRA sunshine requirement, some banks such as Wells
Fargo identified in its own sunshine filing its $250,000 contributions to NCRC (see Table 3).
11 For example, NCRC claims that it was the “lead organization” for the introduction of the CRA
Modernization Act of 2001 (NCRC, 2002B).  Also, their internet announcement of their “Advanced
CRA Manual” boasts that it includes a “Case study of how NCRC and one of our member organizations
commented on a CRA exam and merger application and almost flunked the lender and stopped the
merger application” (NCRC, 2002C).
12 Many nonprofits publish their IRS Form 990 on their own web sites to keep members informed of
their financial situation, including key revenue and expense items.26
Need for CRA Sunshine
The sunshine requirement is a refreshing start to disclose the nature of relationships within the
CRA Triangle, especially when they can impact CRA public policy.   This was the case during
Wells Fargo Bank’s 1995 hostile bid for First Interstate, the second–largest merger ever at that
time.  Unfortunately, there was no sunshine law in effect at that time.
The Greenlining Institute in San Francisco refused to disclose what were believed to be
significant direct and indirect contributions from Wells Fargo Bank during and prior to the
merger.  While the California Reinvestment Committee, most other independent community
groups, and more than 600 commenters, including the author, favored First Bank System's white
knight bid or some alternative deal, the Greenlining Institute was reportedly responsible for 120
of the 135 (89%) of the witnesses supporting Wells Fargo.
As part of the author’s comment on this merger, the FED and Wells Fargo were repeatedly
petitioned to disclose the bank's contributions to Greenlining, but both refused.  The Greenlining
Institute, aware of these repeated requests, remained silent.  In fact, the FED's order approving
the merger specifically refused the author’s request that they consider Wells Fargo's
contributions to community groups like the Greenlining Institute when weighing comments on
the merger (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1996).
It can be argued that the FED, which apparently has yet to meet a big bank merger it has
not liked, would have approved that deal anyway.  A CRA sunshine law in 1995, however,
would have disinfected that approval process and explained why the Greenlining Institute
virtually stood alone among community groups in supporting Wells Fargo Bank.
Today, thanks to the sunshine law, we can determine the financial relationship between the
Greenlining Institute and Wells Fargo.  Using selected excerpts from their first such filing
available from the regulators, Table 4 indicates that the $260,000 from that bank was
Greenlining’s most important source of contributions in their 1999 fiscal year.
According to this table, total bank and thrift contributions for that year for this one
community group were nearly $1 million, resulting, after salaries and other expenses, in an
excess contribution (“net income”) of $0.6 million.  Contributions of $259,500 to their minority
and diversity programs are separately listed in Table 4.
It is interesting to note that there are many banks in the U.S. that did not even make $0.6
million in net income in 1999.  According to the FDIC’s web site, of the 10,220 banks and
thrifts at the end of 1999, 4,194 or 41% had income of less than $0.6 million (FDIC, 2002A).27
Thus, the Greenlining Institute, whose primary source of income is banks and thrifts, is making
more money than roughly four of every ten such financial institutions.
The top officers of that community group, with total 1999 compensation and contributions
(to benefit plans and deferred compensation) in the $140,000 range (see Table 4), probably
make more than the top officers of many banks and their regulators.
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Like a banker complaining about the CRA regulatory burden, Greenlining’s legal counsel
strongly criticized the CRA sunshine requirement as “bureaucratic and onerous,” not to mention
a First Amendment violation of free speech (Gnaizda, 2001).
In justifying the need for a race–based CRA and a new race reporting requirements for
CRA small–business lending data, that Greenlining representative commended by name two
“progressive financial institutions,” namely Washington Mutual and Wells Fargo, that supported
such a requirement.  It is interesting to note from Table 4, that Washington Mutual is the only
institution that has given more money to the Greenlining Institute than Wells Fargo, counting
that community group’s minority/diversity programs.
Potential Failure of the CRA Triangle
In all fairness to the Greenlining Institute, it has been a lightning rod for community activism in
California and elsewhere by ”using a combination of tools, including negotiation, litigation,
media coverage, and community education,” according to their IRS Form 990.  They have been
in the forefront of the movement to extend CRA to insurance companies and brokerage firms,
which their legal counsel claims will triple the impact of CRA (Rehm, 2002).
They have sponsored CRA and fair lending conferences that FED Chairman Greenspan has
keynoted, and their legal counsel has personally met with President Bush to discuss CRA topics.
This community group has the ear of and access to the top two people in the Beltway, and it
would appear that everyone, including those in the White House, returns their calls.
To the extent they have become so visible and powerful as a representative of the CRA and
fair lending movement, this raises an interesting public policy question.  What if, for example,
they are asked by one of their top financial institution contributors (e.g., Washington Mutual or
Wells Fargo) to put in a good word for them with the top people in Washington, perhaps about a
                                           
13 Other community groups have reported relatively sizable “net income” levels, including NCRC, which
showed a net of $0.4 million in both 1999 and 2000.  According to their IRS Form 990, NCRC’s top28
controversial topic like their subprime lending or during a difficult period when they need help?
This would not be that dissimilar to what apparently happened in 1995 when Greenlining
virtually stood alone among community groups in supporting Wells Fargo in their successful
hostile takeover.
Another example of a similar potential public policy issue is the case where the CEO and a
fellow board member of a prominent national community group also serve on the board,
including one in the role of its chair, of a for–profit fund selling CRA investments to banks.
Moreover, each of the respective organizations contains web links to and even articles
promoting each other.  While there is no public information on any financial or other
relationship between these organizations, it is possible that the community group’s position on
maintaining the Investment Test may be affected by this relationship.  All of the details of such
a relationship should be disclosed in any CRA reform or other public comment about the
Investment Test.
While we expect bank trade groups and their lobbyists to take pro–industry (and sometimes
but not always anti–consumer) positions, this is not expected for a community group.  This
could result in a failure of the CRA Triangle to properly function, and instead of the FED–
distorted CRA Triangle in Figure 2, the result would be a community group–distorted one.  At
least with CRA sunshine, we might be able to explain some of these potential failures.
CRA: THE FUTURE
Past Reform Proposals Still Relevant Today
One of the beauties of CRA is that it is periodically reformed to keep it current and responsive
to the needs of both communities and banks.  Fortunately, CRA is once again being reformed
this year on its 25
th anniversary.  This will be its second scheduled reform after the 1993–95 first
major effort.  While it is possible that the current reform will require multiple proposals, the
number of current comments relative to those submitted during the last reform (see below) do
not suggest that this will be the case.
Regulators realized during the last reform effort that they might not get everything “right.”
They consequently built in a required reform for 2002, which would give at least five years of
                                                                                                                                           
officer had compensation and contributions in 2000 of $168,000, up from $130,000 in 1999 (IRS, 1999
and 2000).  Again, many top bank officers and regulators are not compensated at these levels.29
experience with all aspects of the new CRA (that was transitioned in during 1996 and 1997).
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Now with this experience we can improve on those parts of CRA that encouraged access to LMI
credit and eliminate or modify those that did not have this effect.
Thomas (1993) made numerous recommendations to reform CRA.  Table 5 summarizes the
key such recommendations made in that 1993 book.  Many of those recommendations were
adopted in the 1995 final CRA reform effort.  With the exception of the suggestion concerning a
CRA “assessment proposal,” most of those recommendations are still relevant today, except for
those that have already been adopted.
 Thomas (1998) restated and argued for the top 10 recommendations that were still relevant
at that time.  These recommendations are summarized in Table 6.  With the exception of
mandatory Investment and Service Tests for the small bank streamlined exam (#7), these
recommendations are still relevant today.
15
Proposed 2002 Reform Process
The Appendix contains the July 19, 2001 Federal Register notice of the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for the reform of the CRA regulations (Federal Register, 2001).
The ANPR begins by raising some fundamental general issues about the need for and overall
approach to CRA reform.  It then identifies eight specific issues for comment:
1.   Large Retail Institutions: Lending, Investment, and Service Tests
2.   Small Institutions: The Streamlined Small Institution Evaluation
3.   Limited Purpose and Wholesale Institutions: The Community Development Test
4.   Strategic Plan
5.   Performance Context
6.   Assessment Areas
7.   Activities of Affiliates
8.   Data Collection and Maintenance of Public Files
                                           
14 The reforms recommended here call for a mandatory review and potential reform of CRA five years
after the complete transition to the present reforms; if the reforms due out in 2002 are fully transitioned
by the end of next year, the next reform should occur in 2008.
15 The reforms recommended here will maintain the status quo of optional Investment and Service Tests
in the small bank streamlined exam to improve a Satisfactory rating.30
The comment period closed on October 17, 2001, and the four bank and thrift regulators
received approximately 400 different comments.  This was only 6% of the 6,700 comments
received on the first December 1993 CRA reform effort.  This suggests either satisfaction with
the current regulations or perhaps relative indifference or more likely some combination thereof.
CRA Reform Comment Analysis
The author made multiple FOIA requests of the four bank and thrift agencies for all submitted
comments.  While the OTS was the only user–friendly agency having these comment letters on
line, the other regulators are hopefully moving in that direction.
Almost all of the comments to the regulators came from either community groups or the
bank and thrift industry.   Again, from the perspective of the CRA Triangle, the regulators are
acting as a referee or perhaps arbitrator to come up with the socially optimal reform proposal
that will best meet public policy goals.
The author reviewed these comments and categorized them as from either group and
summarized the most common elements of the two views.  A common profile quickly
developed, oftentimes the result of the views of the most prominent community group and
industry trade associations.
Some of these national organizations, on both the community group side (e.g., NCRC and
the Woodstock Institute) and bank side (e.g., Independent Community Bankers of America)
sides, circulated CRA reform comment “boilerplate” or form letters, which added to the quantity
but not quality of comments.
In fact, the “NCRC Sample Letter on the CRA ANPR,” which was widely circulated on the
internet, was reprinted on October 16, 2001 on congressional letterhead and signed by 23
Members of Congress.  The NCRC form letter was even reprinted on the stationery of a well–
known law professor who has written on CRA.
Two tables were prepared using the submitted comments of the most prominent and
representative community groups and industry associations, as well as those from a few
individual financial institutions.  These tables only present selected excerpts from the submitted
comments, many of which were quite lengthy, in a standard format based on the above ANPR
eight issues for comment.
Table 7 summarizes ten industry views on CRA reform, mainly those of trade groups with a
few individual financial institutions.  Table 8 presents a comparable tabulation of ten views31
from the most prominent community groups.  Almost all of these comments were dated October
17, 2001, the last date for public comment.  The following discussion will not only reference
these representative comments but also those from other banks and community groups.
Comments from Special Interests Outside of the CRA Triangle
The comment analysis here focused on those coming from the community group and industry
corners of the CRA Triangle, as the relevant regulators did not submit comments.
16  Several
individuals submitted comments, but most of these were boilerplate letters, most likely
downloaded in response to community group internet requests to submit them.
A few vendors who sell securities to banks and thrifts to satisfy their Investment Test
requirements submitted comments, but they were clearly one–sided in promoting their special
interests.
For example, a mutual fund that sells its qualified investment product nationwide requested
that financial institutions be given more flexibility in choosing which of the three tests they
should be evaluated under, much like the community development test (which they felt should
be applied to all banks and thrifts).  This fund would eliminate the 50% weighting for the
Lending Test and have CRA investments be weighted identically to loans.
The “CRA premium” for CRA qualified investments has been the bane of banks (see
following sections) but the boon of brokers.  The commenting mutual fund proposed that banks
purchasing loans or securities at a premium be given additional CRA credit.  Because of an
apparent concern that banks may be “padding” their investments with grants and contributions,
they should be counted under the Service Test according to this investment vendor.
In an apparent effort to broaden the market for CRA investments beyond large banks, this
fund proposed that small banks be allowed to include targeted MBS as part of the streamlined
Lending Test.  Finally, and not surprisingly, this securities firm noted that they failed to see the
validity of the argument regarding the availability of qualified investments.
The Optimal CRA Reform Recommendations
The 20 tabulation summaries in Tables 7 and 8, while accounting for just 5% of the roughly 400
total comments, are quite representative of the overall community and industry views.  Using
the respective community and industry profiles adopted in this analysis, in addition to the input32
from the remaining community and industry comment letters, the “optimal” reform strategy was
developed as being the one most responsive to both of these corners of the CRA Triangle.
Table 9 summarizes the specific “optimal” reform recommendations for CRA.  Many of
these recommendations were previously made by the author, as seen in Tables 5 and 6.  Several
of the reform proposals in Table 9 were discussed elsewhere (e.g., Thomas, 2001A).
The following discussion of the most controversial CRA reform issues highlights the
different perspectives of the industry and community group corners of the CRA Triangle and
why the recommended reform package in Table 9 is the optimal one.
Regulatory Interest in the Investment Test
The first public proposal from a regulator to eliminate the Investment Test came from former
FDIC Chairman Donna Tanoue, who suggested replacing it with a new Community
Development test (Heller, 2000).
While the OCC was the bastion of CRA regulatory intelligence during Eugene Ludwig’s
tenure as Comptroller, this function switched to the FDIC when the OCC’s well–respected CRA
guru, Steve Cross, became head of the FDIC’s Division of Compliance and Consumer Affairs in
May 1999.  The managing director of the OTS compliance function as well as top compliance
people from other agencies joined Division Director Cross the following year.   Since the FDIC
became the new CRA regulatory brain trust, this agency’s position on replacing the Investment
Test was well thought out and responsive to both consumer and industry interests.
While other regulators generally have been silent on the controversial Investment Test, the
FED’s San Francisco bank has established and aggressively promoted an entire Investment Test
infrastructure, which is generally perceived as being supportive of this test.  For example, the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Community Affairs Department has six separate
“Community Investment Specialists” who put on a series of quarterly roundtables throughout
the West.
The San Francisco FED has their own Community Investments publication, and the March
2002 “Special Edition” titled “A Guide to Community Development Investments” contains
articles by several non–profit and for–profit Investment Test vendors with contact information
(Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2002).  These and other vendors have appeared at
numerous roundtables and other FED–sponsored CRA conferences to promote qualified
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investments, and many of them have been most successful in this regard with banks and thrifts
in that region.
Unlike most of the other Federal Reserve Banks, the Community Affairs Department of the
San Francisco FED has more of a pro–industry than pro–consumer reputation (Thomas, 1998).
Several of their conferences, many of which are held at plush resorts, have been co–sponsored
with industry trade groups.  The previous head of their Community Affairs Department became
an officer at the largest financial institution in Hawaii.
This background is relevant to the extent that this substantial Investment Test infrastructure
at the FED serves as a motivating force for them to maintain the status quo (i.e., the Investment
Test).  If there is no Investment Test or alternatively a significantly reduced one, will there be a
need for the San Francisco FED’s glossy Community Investments magazine or their several
community investment conferences?  What about their numerous community investment
specialists, the most senior of whom probably developed valuable contacts in the banking and
securities industries?
Good public policy by the federal bank regulators dictates that their one and only concern
must be what is in the public interest, giving appropriate consideration to both consumers and
the industry alike.  Hopefully the FED’s position on CRA reform will not be influenced by their
San Francisco bank’s significant Investment Test infrastructure.
Similar potential conflicts may exist in some very large banks that have likewise built up
significant Investment (and Service) Test infrastructures.  What if you were hired because of
your expertise and contacts in these specific areas that now might be eliminated or greatly cut
back?  Again, stockholder rather than employee special interests should dictate bank policy on
the Investment or Service Tests, and regulators must consider the source of all comments.
Elimination of Investment and Service Tests
Many large banks and virtually every bank trade association are rightfully asking that CRA be
returned to its LMI lending roots by abolishing the Investment Test and, to a lesser extent,
Service Test experiments or at least making them optional as is presently the case for small
banks.
The $400 million Southern Commercial Bank of St. Louis, in its October 10, 2001 CRA
reform comment, asks: “If CRA is about banks meeting the credit needs of their communities
why are there investment and service tests?”34
Community groups generally want to keep everything in CRA and add new requirements.  They
are loathe to admit that any part of the law or its implementing rules and regulations cannot be
cost–benefit justified, as the apparent goal is to increase not decrease the coverage and scope of
the law.
This can, however, be counterproductive since the extraneous Investment and Service Tests
reduce by 50% the weight given to LMI lending.  For this reason, good public policy dictates
that these two tests be reduced to individual performance evaluation factors under the Lending
Test, as long as they can be documented to be LMI–credit related (see Table 9).  At some point,
these two tests can even become optional to improve a Satisfactory rating, as is presently the
case under the streamlined small bank exam.
Reduce Grade Inflation by Removing Two of Three Inflated Tests
The most comprehensive CRA grade inflation analysis of actual large bank exams revealed that
fully 71% of the ratings on the Investment Test were inflated by one grade, compared to 32%
and 29% comparable inflation rates for the Lending and Service Tests, respectively (Thomas,
1998).  Thus, the Investment Test was determined to be a primary cause of overall CRA grade
inflation.
Several government agencies have examined various inconsistency and other problems
associated with CRA exams and ratings (see U.S General Accounting Office, 1995 and Office
of Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1998), but they do not, perhaps for
political reasons, broach the highly controversial issue of grade inflation.
This practice changed, however, with a December 21, 2000 internal evaluation of OTS PEs
(see Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2001).  This study was
“unable to validate the appropriateness of the investment component ratings” for 41% of its
sample. 
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Regarding the Investment Test, the OTS study found “apparent rating inconsistencies” as
well as “limited instances where the investments component may have been rated higher than
warranted.”  The analysis concluded with ten very useful recommendations to ensure that PEs
provide an accurate performance assessment. The optimal public policy reforms advocated in
                                           
17 The comparable percentage in this OTS study for the only other test evaluated in this way was 20% for
the Lending Test; thus, the Investment Test is at least twice as problematic as the Lending Test in this
regard.35
this Working Paper adopt all of them (see Table 9).
The October 8, 2001 comment from the Center for Community Capitalism of the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill suggested that grade inflation existed in the Service
Test.  While that study used a streamlined macro–analysis comparing CRA component test
ratings, this same conclusion was reached earlier by Thomas (1998) using a detailed micro–
analysis based on a re–examination of individual bank PEs.
Besides the methodology issue, the UNC results must be interpreted with some caution
because the authors may have misunderstood how to classify low–cost accounts in the Service
Test.  When the OCC was asked to clarify this issue, they cited the relevant regs and interagency
Q&As to conclude that a low–cost or basic banking checking account is generally considered a
retail banking service; however, if it is targeted to LMI people, it would be considered a
community development service (OCC, 2002).  The UNC study, which failed to make this
important distinction, assumed all low–cost accounts as CD services, when some of them are
not directed to LMI individuals.
Regardless of the methodology and related technical issues, there is a general consensus
that grade inflation is a serious concern, not just with individual tests but also with overall
ratings.  One remedy generally advanced by community groups is to make both the Investment
and Service Tests much more quantitative and rigorous, often with new ratios and guidelines.
This, however, would result in an additional burden not just for banks and thrifts, but also for
regulators, some of whom (e.g., the OTS) are facing budget cuts.
The optimal solution to reducing grade inflation with these two tests is not to expand their
data and analysis but to eliminate the tests by converting them into separate performance rating
factors under the key Lending Test.  To the extent these tests benefit LMI credit, they will be
appropriately counted, but not at a morbidly obese 50% of the final rating.
Why the Service Test Should be Eliminated
The Service Test includes both retail banking and CD services (see Table 2).  One reason why
there is considerable inflation in this test is the fact that every bank, which is in the “financial
services” business by definition, provides some sort of retail banking service and is therefore
entitled to some credit.  Many banks make no qualified investments, and some banks make few
if any loans during certain review periods.  But, every bank including internet ones offers some
retail banking service under the terms of its charter.36
Another problem with the Service Test is the confusion that sometimes exists between its
two main retail banking and CD components, such as the previously cited one in the UNC
study.  Also, CD services are often subjectively defined by examiners.  CD services that can be
documented to encourage access to and the provision of LMI credit are useful and deserve
credit.  This is also the case for retail banking services of this type.  But, not to the tune of 25%,
the current weighting for this test, which effectively dilutes the Lending Test.
For the above and other reasons, both the retail banking and CD services should be folded
into the Lending Test as separately evaluated factors, but only if they can be documented to be
LMI–credit related.   Under this proposed reform, banks and community groups involved in
such LMI–credit related activities will still benefit, but not to the same degree.
Community Groups Potentially Conflicted in Defending Investment and Service Tests
Community group attempts to defend the non–lending tests are not only unrealistic but also
somewhat self serving.  In the case of the Service Test, some groups benefit by acting either
directly as a beneficiary of some CD services or indirectly by sometimes being compensated for
performing such services by banks (e.g., home ownership counseling to LMI home buyers).
This is a relatively minor concern compared to the Investment Test.
The actual and potential conflict is most apparent with the Investment Test, as some groups
have significant financial incentives to maintain it.  Bank contributions to community groups
count as qualified CRA investments, and the groups may feel this source of funding will be
reduced or perhaps even eliminated without a standalone Investment Test.
The defense of the Investment Test in this regard was quite clear in the October 15, 2001
CRA reform comment of the Chicago Association of Neighborhood Development
Organizations (CANDO): “Over 22% of CANDO’s revenues, for next fiscal year, are projected
to come from grants by our bank partners.   Grants from banks have provided critical operating
support.” Grants are just the tip of the iceberg for some community groups.
There would be, for example, an even greater incentive to defend the Investment Test in the
case where a community group and a for–profit CRA investment firm have: an interlocking
Board of Directors; an arrangement where each promotes their affiliation with the other in
newsletters and web sites; and, an agreement that relates community group funding to CRA
investments sold.37
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) in its October 2, 2001 CRA
reform comment strongly defended the Investment Test.  This group complained that “CRA
examiners do not differentiate among types of investments or consider the extent to which
investments are not routinely provided by the private sector.”  An example was provided:
“…grants to nonprofits are scarcer than investments in municipal bonds.”  This was followed by
a most unusual proposal: “CRA exams could readily incorporate ratios that compare grants as a
percent of bank assets…”
The National Congress for Community Economic Development’s October 15, 2001 CRA
reform comment proposed a ratio measuring bank grants against a bank’s recent earnings.
The Greenlining Institute’s October 15, 2001 CRA reform comment complained that
“Philanthropy for economic development is inadequately rewarded on CRA exams.”  Rather
than calling for new ratios measuring and comparing grants, this community group argued that
“bonus credits should be give for key grants.”
ACORN’s October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment unabashedly proposed that “Most
notably, grants or commitments that support effective community efforts…should be given
more weight than other investments.”
The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, a public nonprofit established by Congress,
made the following October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment about the impact of the loss of
access to local decision–makers:  “Under such circumstances, substantive grants or investments
in nonprofit organizations…should be encouraged.  Regulators may wish to expand the range
and value of incentives that encourage institutions to make these kinds of investments.”
To defend a questionable test that can financially and otherwise benefit community groups
is one thing, but to propose new grant–measuring ratios or awarding bonus credits for grants is
pushing the envelope.  Community groups should realize that they received grants from banks
before the Investment Test and will continue to receive them even if that test is eliminated or
greatly reduced in scope.
Meanwhile, in the same way that the author requested that the FED should consider the
source of one community group’s comments on the 1995 Wells Fargo merger proposal, so too
should the regulators consider the source of such community group comments on the reform of
the Investment Test.38
Misleading “Equity Investment” Defense of the Investment Test
The main defense of the Investment Test by community groups is an oft–repeated 1999 quote
from FED Chairman Greenspan stressing the need for greater “equity” investment in small
businesses in lower–income communities (Greenspan, 1999).
This is, unfortunately, somewhat misleading, as most CRA “qualified investments” under
the Investment Test are not of this type but rather purchased and repurchased LMI mortgage
backed securities or even certain municipal bonds and minority bank certificates of deposit.
This is a very important distinction, because true equity investments as referenced in the
Greenspan quote are very much the exception rather than the rule.
The Bank of America October 16, 2001 comment, for example, pointed out that “Equity
funding is less in demand and more expensive to maintain as part of balance sheet management.
Moreover, equity is a form of permanent and often nontransferable funding.”
California Federal Bank’s October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment was even more blunt by
stating that the current Investment Test results in “equity investments that are effectively grants
with virtually no hope of a yield or return of principal.”
Community bankers have likewise come to this realization as seen from this October 12,
2001 CRA reform comment by First American Bank in Elk Grove Village, IL:
“Grants, regardless of their putative goodness, were never contemplated by CRA.
The Act itself only addresses credit needs.  Every ‘investment’ opportunity that we’ve
been presented with has been substantially uneconomic….At best, these investments
hold significantly below market returns.  At worst, they are actual or de facto grants.”
Community groups are also fond of defending the Investment Test by stressing the need for
long–term, “patient” capital.  In reality, their emphasis on direct grants and “indirect grants”
(i.e., a troubled equity investment) is usually more short– than long–term.  This point is
emphasized in the October 10, 2001 CRA reform comment by Commerce Bank of Kansas City,
MO:
“There still remains a question as to whether or not donation type investments were
ever intended to be a part of the regulation for evaluation purposes.  Encouraging
institutions to make profitable qualified long–term investments would be more in line
with the intent of the law than short–term charitable donations.”
“Community Enrichment Act”
An entire “CRA investment” industry has been created by Wall Street to take advantage of the
shortage of qualified investments, which, when coupled with the increased demand for them,39
has created a “CRA premium.”  The problem is that many of the Wall Street opportunists that
have moved into CRA are more interested in profiteering off of CRA investments than
increasing LMI credit.  But, this is not surprising whenever Wall Street meets Main Street.
The General Counsel for BancorpSouth, Inc. in Tupelo, MS writes in his October 17, 2001
CRA reform comment about the dilemma of meeting CRA goals with limited qualified
investment opportunities:
“Securities dealers have ‘learned’ of this dilemma for financial institutions and are
directly taking advantage of the dilemma.  Securities dealers structure complex, risk–
laden investments in a regulatory environment that is hyper–sensitive to risk
management on the part of the bank.  CRA requirements have therefore actually
created a cottage industry within the investment community as dealers have
discovered that banks are willing to pay above–market prices just to obtain CRA
eligible investments.”
This same source identified the CRA premium on a mortgage–backed security (MBS) of one–
half to three–quarters points vs. the one–eighth point the dealer would normally make on an
identical, non–CRA instrument.
Interchange Bank of NJ, in their October 17, 2001 comment, claimed that this premium is as
much as one full point and “is doing nothing more than fattening the wallets of Wall Street.”
A recent Forbes article titled the “Insider Enrichment Act “ exposed how CRA “helps
certain wealthy investors get wealthier” (Kellner, 2001).   The article focuses on how the
nation’s largest black–owned investment bank and asset manager with $4 billion under
management is “exploiting” the CRA “gold mine” through a $125 million fund.
Matthew Lee of the Inner City Public Interest Law Center in the Bronx, stated in that article
that the referenced CRA fund was a “perversion of the CRA.”  This fund was later cited as
justification for returning CRA to its LMI lending roots (Thomas, 2002).
Investment Test Profiteers
There are many other such Wall Street CRA profiteers likewise getting rich off the Investment
Test.  Unfortunately, there are little visible improvements in LMI credit access as a result of
these activities.
California Federal Bank’s October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment complained that the
shortage of qualified investments has resulted in “newly formed investments that are highly
risky and/or simply create profit opportunities for intermediaries with no or little benefit passed40
on to the community.”  One such cited example: “Funds have been created that provide no or
minimal added value to lower–income communities, but rather create profit opportunities to
fund managers.”
WestAmerica Bank of Fairfield, CA writes in their September 27, 2001 CRA reform
comment that the premium and competition for the limited number of qualified CRA
investments is “not passed through to the schools and cities who have formed the securities but
generated as profit to underwriters and traders.”
The current Investment Test has led to many “qualified investments” that merely recycle
existing ones with no new underlying LMI loans being created.  One LMI loan may be bought
and sold many times and then securitized and repeatedly traded as an LMI MBS.  Since it is
defined as a “qualified” CRA investment, many banks get CRA credit for but one underlying
LMI loan.
While Investment Test vendors and even their banking clients will argue that such activities
“enhance access to LMI credit,” this is not unlike their Wall Street brethren churning a portfolio
for commissions.  Some MBS have been churned so much by the Investment Test that the
underlying LMI purpose of the original loan and CRA has been long forgotten.
A community banker originating an LMI loan may even remember the property location and
perhaps the name of the family.  MBS purchasers only remember the amount of “CRA
premium” paid to the securities broker and how much credit they got from the CRA examiner.
All of this and more is the result of the Investment Test animal created in the last CRA reform.
The October 15, 2001 comment of the California Reinvestment Committee, while defending
the Investment Test in terms of grants to community groups, among other things, perceptively
stated that “One type of investment that has limited meaning for community development is
mortgage–backed securities which appear all too often on the investment lists of financial
institutions.”
California Federal Bank’s October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment stated that the lack of
qualified investments has caused institutions to convert loans into investments: “This is costly
with no compensating benefit to the transaction or the community being served and can increase
the level of repayment risk to the institution.”
JPMorgan Chase’s October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment about the Investment Test
“numbers game” emphasized its relatively limited community development value:41
“The current stand–alone Investment Test for large retail banks is of concern because
there are not enough eligible investment funds or other investment vehicles to grow a
large, profitable, responsive and diverse CRA portfolio that has a meaningful impact
on local community development needs.  There may be enough investment
opportunities, however, to grow a very large, modestly profitable portfolio of CRA
eligible investments that has little community development value in terms of
responsiveness to community development needs.  In a numbers game, the latter is
the portfolio of choice.”
These “numbers game” and other problems with the Investment Test were unforeseen
during the 1993–95 CRA reform process.  As pointed out by California Federal Bank, “While
the inclusion of a standalone investment test in the 1995 Amendments was innovative and well
intended, it has not worked well and its unintended consequences have been severe.”
Besides failing the cost–benefit test (except for Investment Test vendors and grant–happy
community groups), the 25% weighted test, like the equally–weighted Service Test, reduce by
one half the import of the key Lending Test.  This has resulted in a 50% dilution of the LMI
impact of CRA, and this is not good public policy.
The Proposed Streamlined Exam for Large Banks
The streamlined small institution evaluation has been quite popular with the industry, although
persistent grade inflation has been a continued problem.  The small bank exam is totally focused
on lending and includes specific LMI ratios; the optional Investment and Service Tests may
allow a Satisfactory rating at a small bank to be increased to an Outstanding one.
There is no question that the small bank streamlined exam is less of a regulatory burden than
the comparable large bank retail exam.  According to the October 17, 2001 comment by the
California Bankers Association, one member bank that recently graduated from the small to the
large bank exam experienced over $50,000 of additional costs unrelated to the investment of
new dollars or services into its community.
One of the goals of good CRA public policy is to streamline the large bank exam as much as
possible.  As seen in Table 9, the optimal CRA reform results in a streamlined exam for large
banks, since the two of the three current tests would be eliminated.  The result is that the new
Lending Test would count for 100% rather than just half of the overall CRA rating.
The 1995 revised CRA regs make an important distinction between the performance criteria
within each test and the performance rating factors within the performance ratings matrix used
by examiners.42
In the case of the Lending Test, there are five performance criteria and seven rating factors
(see Table 2).  Since there are five possible ratings in the Lending Test performance ratings
matrix, there are 35 possible cells.
By comparison, the Investment Test contains four performance criteria and three factors in
its 15–cell ratings matrix, while the Service Test has six criteria and four factors in its 20–cell
ratings matrix.  Thus, there are a total of 70 possible cells in all three large bank exam matrices.
The current CRA regs specify five performance criteria for the Lending Test:  lending
activity, geographic distribution, borrower characteristics, CD lending, and innovative or
flexible lending.
The proposed streamlined exam for large banks would include eight criteria.  The first four
Lending Test criteria would remain the same, but the fifth current innovative/flexible factor
would be replaced by a “Qualitative LMI Lending Characteristics” factor.  This factor would
also include consideration of any predatory or other adverse credit factors that would impact
LMI people or areas as well as small businesses/farms.  Conversely, a bank would be given
additional credit for graduating qualified LMI subprime customers into prime ones.  The three
new evaluation criteria would be investments, CD services, and retail banking services that can
be documented to help meet the credit needs of LMI people and neighborhoods as well as small
businesses/farms.
Thus, the proposed streamlined large bank exam summarized in Table 9 would include the
following eight performance criteria:
1.  Lending activity
2.  Geographic distribution
3.  Borrower characteristics
4.  CD lending
5.  Qualitative LMI lending characteristics
6.  LMI credit–related investments (replacing the Investment Test)
7.  LMI credit–related CD services (replacing the CD portion of the Service Test)
8.  LMI credit–related retail banking services (replacing the retail banking service portion of the
Service Test)
The actual Lending Test Performance Ratings Matrix from the 1995 regs divides the
geographic distribution criterion into two items and adds a highly–economically–disadvantaged43
item.  Thus, under those regs there are not five but rather seven performance rating factors (see
Table 2).
Just as the current CRA regs convert the five performance criteria into seven performance
rating factors, the proposed streamlined large bank exam would convert the eight new criteria
into the following ten ratings factors:
1.    Lending activity levels responsive to AA credit needs  % loans in AA
2.    Borrower distribution by income and business/ farm size in AA
3.    Geographic distribution of loans in AA
4.    Lending to highly economically disadvantaged geographies and low income people and
very small businesses in AA
5.    Qualitative LMI lending characteristics
6.    CD lending activities
7.    LMI credit–related investments
8.    LMI credit–related CD services
9.    LMI credit–related retail banking services
The resultant performance ratings matrix for the large retail bank streamlined exam would have
these ten factors times five possible ratings for 50 possible cells.  This matrix with the ratings
would be published in each PE.  While an explicit weighting scheme for the different factors
would result in a more quantitative approach, the PC and related exam factors should determine
the appropriate weighting.
As noted in Table 9, the overall CRA rating would now be one of five rather than four
possible ratings.  Table 9 also contains specific recommendations regarding performance
evaluation procedures such as a time–sensitive evaluation (and pro–rata weighting) over the
review period and limited (pro–rata) credit for CRA qualifying activities commencing within six
months of an exam starting date.
The proposed large retail bank exam would be streamlined for both banks and examiners alike
since:
1.  There would be one rather than three tests (a 67% reduction)
2.  There would be a total of ten rather than 15 performance criteria (a 33% reduction)44
3.  There would be one rather than three performance ratings matrices (a 67% reduction)
4. There would be 50 rather than 70 individual rating matrix cells (a 29% reduction)
Those large banks with extensive CRA investments and services will continue to garner credit
under this streamlined large bank exam, as long as they are legitimately LMI credit–related.  In
the event the current grade inflation and other problems associated with the Investment and
Service Tests continue, they can become optional factors as is presently the case with the small
bank exam.   Although this recommended approach allows for a smooth transition, these two
tests may have to ultimately be eliminated depending upon the future experience with them
under this streamlined approach.
Expansion of Definition of “Small” Banks to Qualify for Streamlined Exam
The Number One priority for small banks is to increase the minimum allowable size by which
such banks can qualify for the streamlined exam.  Community groups are against any such
increases.
Currently, a small bank is defined as one with assets of $250 million or less that is an
independent institution or affiliated with a holding company with less than $1 billion in assets.
The streamlined test represents a significant time and cost savings compared to the large bank
exam.
As seen in Table 7, most bank trade groups would increase the former number to at least $1
billion and either remove the latter requirement or increase it to as much as $5 billion.
Community groups, on the other hand, according to Table 8, would keep this definition
unchanged and even make this exam less streamlined (e.g., NCRC’s proposal to make the
optional Investment and Service Tests mandatory).
The optimal solution from a public policy perspective is to double the current independent
minimum asset level to $500 million, a number commonly associated with a “community bank”
in today’s competitive environment.  The comparable holding company minimum should
likewise double to $2 billion.
The proposed $500 million and under definition for a community bank has been used by
many regulators.  For example, a recent FED article (Hall and Yeager, 2002) about community
banks noted that “Community banks are typically smaller banks; most have fewer than $50045
million in assets.”   Also, an OCC economist (Whalen, 2001) used the same $500 million and
less range to define a community bank.
In fact, several small banks and thrifts (e.g., State Bank of LaCrosse, WI; Ledyard National
Bank of Hanover, NH; First State Bank of Irvington, KY; and, even the New Jersey League of
Community & Savings Bankers) departed from the CRA reform boilerplate letter circulated by
their national trade groups and recommended a $500 million and under rather than $1 billion
asset level as a reasonable definition of a small bank.
Probably the most compelling argument in favor of the $500 million and under small bank
definition is the fact that it would encompass roughly 90% of the nation’s nearly 10,000 banks
and thrifts compared to the approximately 80% covered with the $250 million and less
definition.  By making the quantum leap to $1 billion and less would take in nearly 95% of the
industry, hardly a reasonable basis for a small/large size distinction.
The fact that the large bank exam would be streamlined under these reform
recommendations may somewhat reduce the urgency of being designated a “small” bank.  Good
public policy should not result in significant differences in compliance burden based solely on
size.
Misguided Community Group Proposal to Make CRA Race Based
Community groups are flat out wrong by asking that CRA become race based, something that
could jeopardize the future of this needs–based law.   Nothing could be more damaging to CRA
than to change or even redirect its primary focus away from LMI lending.
Most leading community groups have explicitly called for a race–based CRA in addition to
its statutory needs–based (LMI) history.  Even some respected researchers have apparently
confused the statutory intent of CRA in this regard by frequently mentioning “minority”
communities alongside “lower–income” ones in their discussions of CRA (e.g., Harvard
University, 2002).
NCRC, one of many D.C.–based community groups, wants minorities to be explicitly
considered on the Lending Test just like LMI people and areas.  The Greenlining Institute
argues in its October 15, 2001 CRA reform comment that “CRA exams should not be
colorblind,” citing the large percentage of minorities in California.
What is not mentioned by that community group, however, is the fact that, California, our
largest state, is now “majority–minority” according to the 2000 Census, which means over half46
(i.e., 51% to be exact) of its population is made up of designated minorities, specifically
Latinos, Asian Americans, African Americans, and Native Americans (Munoz, 2000).
Census Bureau data analyzed by the Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy at the
Brookings Institution found that 52 of the 100 most populous cities in the U.S. are majority–
minority (Schmitt, 2001).  In fact, some demographers have suggested that the entire US will be
majority–minority sometimes around or shortly after the midpoint of this century.
With a majority–minority state or large city, a race–based CRA proposal would lessen the
public policy benefits of the law.  This is because limited resources would be diverted from
helping those people and areas most in need to those people and areas that may or may not be in
need, but just happen to be associated with a certain ethnic group.  Just as there was a backlash
with affirmative action programs, this would make CRA more controversial than ever and more
than likely reduce its strong bipartisan support. CRA has survived for 25 years as a race–blind
law, and any changes in this regard could jeopardize it.
The banking industry would likely not even consider amending CRA to become race based,
although some segments of it have proposed deviating from its LMI–based focus.  Wachovia
Corporation, for example, in its October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment, proposed that the
“community development” definition should be expanded to include all such projects rather
than those in LMI areas.  This misguided proposal, like the race–based idea from community
groups, would likewise serve to undermine the needs–based foundation of CRA.
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Subprime vs. Predatory Lending Issues
Community groups are also playing with a two–edged sword in their efforts to heavily regulate
subprime lending to root out predatory problems. This is because many community group
leaders fail to distinguish between subprime lending which is “good” and predatory lending
which is not.
For example, the head of a national coalition in past congressional testimony tied the two
concepts together by expressing concern over the exponential growth of “subprime (and
potentially predatory) lending” (NCRC, 2000).  Another national community group issued a
news release and study lambasting predatory lending and “financial apartheid,” but all of the
supporting data referred to subprime loans (ACORN, 2000).
                                           
18 This Wachovia proposal should be viewed in light of the reputation of this bank’s predecessor, First
Union, as not being consumer or CRA friendly (see, for example, Thomas, 1998).47
Even worse than confusing subprime and predatory lending, are those who would criticize
others merely for being associated with a subprime product.   This was the case with a
community representative turned professor, who completed a Ph.D. dissertation on CRA
(Metzger, 1999).  He attacked a prominent housing finance professor because he “has ties to the
subprime industry,” due to his association with a firm that sells mortgage origination software to
prime and subprime lenders alike!
Besides the confusion between subprime and predatory lending, some community groups
even propose penalizing banks with legitimate subprime lending.  For example, the October 2,
2001 CRA reform comment of NCRC proposes that “subprime lending must not count as much
as prime lending.”  The October 15, 2001 comment of the California Reinvestment Committee
(CRC) reports that “Survey responses from CRC members overwhelmingly state that financial
institutions should receive little to no credit for subprime lending.”
This confusion between predatory and subprime lending and, worse yet, stigmatizing of the
latter may have the perverse impact of limiting the availability of credit to CRA’s target group,
namely LMI individuals and areas, where subprime lending is important.  Well–meaning public
officials, under pressure from vocal community groups, may be throwing the CRA baby out
with the predatory bath water.  This is not good public policy.
The FED has attempted to clarify the distinction between subprime and predatory lending:
“Just as the expansion of subprime lending has increased access to credit, the expansion of its
unfortunate counterpart, predatory lending, has made many low–income borrowers worse off”
(Gramlich, 2000).
A joint report on predatory lending by two federal departments made the same conclusion:
“Subprime lending serves an important role, by providing loans to borrowers who do not meet
the credit standards for the prime mortgage market.  Some borrowers in the subprime market,
however, may be particularly vulnerable to abusive lending practices” (HUD, 2000).
Not all community groups confuse subprime and predatory lending.  The Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation, a public nonprofit established by Congress, identified still another
problem with the wholesale condemnation of subprime lending in its October 17, 2001 CRA
reform comment:  “We would stress, however, that discouraging regulated institutions from
directly or indirectly engaging in subprime lending could prove counter–productive.  Regulated
institutions are more likely to provide the service in a responsible manner, ”compared to
unregulated institutions, some of whom are “totally unscrupulous” according to this source.48
Another community group that has apparently seen the light on subprime lending is the
Greenlining Institute.  An article about Washington Mutual, the nation’s third largest subprime
mortgage lender, quoted Greenlining’s legal counsel that “Our position from the beginning has
been that we want every major regulated bank doing subprime” (Mandaro, 2001).
The community corner of the CRA Triangle has influenced most of the public policy
involving subprime and predatory lending, including numerous city, county, state, and federal
actual and proposed anti–predatory laws.  Unless the subprime lending industry develops a
unified voice and improved image for its “high risk” lending product, public policy, including
possible federal preemption of local and state anti–predatory laws, will continue to be weighted
against the industry (Thomas, 2001B).  Such a failure of the CRA Triangle will not result in
good public policy.
It makes sense that the qualitative aspects of LMI lending be evaluated in the context of a
CRA exam (see recommendation in Table 9).   Those banks and their affiliates, for example,
that can document a significant effort to move qualified subprime borrowers to the lower–cost
prime market, should receive credit under this qualitative factor.  Those banks and their
affiliates carrying loans deemed to be predatory would be downgraded.  Contrary to the position
of most community groups, this analysis, however, should not include any race–based factors,
which are the province of fair–lending exams.
Assessment Area (AA) Definition
It is not far from the truth to argue that banks and thrifts generally prefer AAs to be as small as
possible, while community groups (and oftentimes the regulators) take the opposite view.  A
larger AA means loan, investment, and service performance will be evaluated for an expanded
area.  This can be costly for banks and thrifts but beneficial to community groups in the
expanded areas, if they can now benefit from additional grants (i.e., a “qualified investment”
under the Investment Test).
Banks and thrifts are generally happy with the current AA approach, as they have the
flexibility to define this key geography with but a few constraints.  Community groups, on the
other hand, would eliminate some of this flexibility, especially for banks with alternative
delivery systems such as internet banks where the groups feel a national AA might be
appropriate.49
These banks and others using the mail, telephone, or brokers to extend nationwide credit
often have pockets of borrowers all over the country but just a small percentage (often 15–25%
or less) from within its AA, typically narrowly defined around its legal residence.  The smaller
AA penalizes that bank in terms of the percentage of lending in its AA, but that local geography
is not the most relevant concept for such a bank.
We must keep in mind, however, that there are a relatively small number of internet and
other such nontraditional banks, excluding those legitimately covered under the limited purpose
and wholesale bank test.  Although there was much hype about internet banks during the dot
com era, there are only a handful of true internet banks remaining.  Some have failed, and others
have opened traditional brick and mortar branches.
It is not good public policy to establish a new AA regulatory framework for all banks based
on the special circumstances of a relatively small number of fairly new and oftentimes
struggling banks, as the new regs will most likely prove an undue burden for all banks.
Some community groups have proposed that internet and similar banks define their AAs on
the basis of their lending market share in local markets, using a very small 0.5% bright line.
Assuming this was a reasonable approach, the relevant cutoff would have to be significantly
higher, perhaps 5–10% or more, before the subject bank’s relative performance might have a
meaningful impact on the local credit market.
Still another suggestion for evaluating the performance of internet banks is to evaluate their
performance under the CD test as originally proposed by the OTS.   This proposal had appeal
when it appeared that internet banks might become so popular to justify their own special
purpose category like limited purpose and wholesale banks.  However, the actual experience
with this exam suggests that it be reserved for truly special purpose banks that are not retail
ones.
Based on the small number of pure–play internet banks, it makes more sense to evaluate
them as the retail banks they are but give them credit for any LMI–related  activity outside of
their AAs, as long as local LMI credit demand is being met by the bank.  This same approach
can be applied to any bank with a nontraditional delivery system.
Thus, this recommendation would maintain the AA status quo but require examiners to
report on the LMI loan characteristics of such a bank’s entire portfolio, regardless of its
location.  This means that even if an internet or other nontraditional bank has a very small
percentage of its loans in its defined AA, the proper PC analysis will result in a lower weighting50
of the AA loan percentage rating factor relative to other performance factors, especially
nonlocal LMI lending.  The examiner evaluating the LMI borrower and geographic
characteristics of the nonlocal lending will give appropriate credit for such CRA lending
regardless of where it occurs.
This would be similar to the recommended approach under the CD test of giving CRA credit
for LMI–related CD activities anywhere, even if outside of the AA or broader statewide and
regional area.  The bottomline should be CRA credit for any legitimate LMI credit-related
activity, regardless of location, as long as local LMI credit needs are first being met.
Elimination of the Strategic Plan Option
Additional streamlining of CRA would come from eliminating the ill–conceived strategic plan
option.  This would reduce the number of possible CRA exams from four to three, a 25%
reduction.  It is good public policy to eliminate regulations that have few benefits relative to
significant costs and uncertainties as is the case with this option (Thomas, 1998).
While most banks would rather keep the strategic plan option in their CRA regulatory
closet for possible use, very few have selected or would ever consider this option.
19  It is
somewhat ironic that the banking industry would favor a reduction in the regulatory burden but
nevertheless insist on keeping this rarely used and controversial CRA regulation on the books.
Community groups are generally in favor of keeping this or any existing part of the regs,
but few have conducted an objective evaluation of it. One of the exceptions is NCRC, which
argues for the elimination of the strategic plan option: “It has been abused too often; banks
declare easy goals and examiners approve these goals.”
It is somewhat ironic that NCRC should now propose the elimination of an option which it
championed so much for during the 1993–95 reform process.  In fact, one of that group’s
directors was reportedly responsible for suggesting and/or promoting this option to the
regulators.  It is even more ironic that a recent proposal by representatives of both NCRC and
the Greenlining Institute to expand CRA to the insurance business called for “strategic
community investment plans” as part of their suggested new requirements (Gamboa and Taylor,
2001).
                                           
19 According to the October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment of the Center for Community Change, only
14 of 9,821 or .01% of FDIC–insured institutions have chosen the strategic plan option.51
Improvement of Public Performance Evaluations
Thomas (1998) made a number of specific recommendations to improve PEs for each of the
different types of CRA exams.  A recent analysis by the Office of Inspector General of the OTS
made ten recommendations to improve the quality of PEs issued by the OTS (Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2001), and most of these were identical to
those in Thomas (1998).
Good public policy would dictate that each of the following OTS recommendations for PEs
should become mandatory for all agencies as part of the current CRA reform:
1.  Better ensure complete and full disclosure as to how examiners evaluated each component
area in arriving at the component ratings.
2.  Seek through FFIEC interagency deliberations, further regulatory guidance as to how an
institution’s CRA performance is to be considered and weighed in the application process.
3.  Consider establishing internal written guidance to better ensure that CRA performance is
taken into consideration in a consistent and uniform manner in the application process.
4.  Ensure that performance context information is appropriately incorporated into the PE
report.
5.  Seek through FFIEC interagency deliberations to establish more objective regulatory criteria
as to how investments are to be assessed.
6.  Provide for quality assurance reviews of CRA examinations to include a broader analysis
comparing inter– and intra–regional examinations and PE reports for consistency.
7.  Seek through FFIEC interagency deliberations to establish objective criteria and/or
clarification as to what constitutes strong lending and CD lending when these activities are
used in support of a Low Satisfactory investment rating for thrifts with little or no qualifying
investments.
8.  Improve controls to better ensure that examiners contact community groups and that the
results of those contacts are more fully described in the PE report.
9.  Assess the value of requiring a comparison of thrift lending relative to assessment area
demographics to enhance the performance context of a thrift’s lending.
10. Provide examiners with further guidance to ensure greater consistency in applying the
agency’s approach to non–traditional thrifts.52
Need for Specialized Compliance Examiners and Exam
The topic of specialized compliance examiners and exams relative to safety and soundness ones
at two of the four regulatory agencies has only become a recent public policy issue in banking.
The primary motivating forces are budget cuts in the case of the OTS and efforts to reduce the
regulatory risk burden in the case of the FDIC.
While budget or regulatory burden cuts could occur anywhere at these two agencies, it
appears that the compliance and CRA areas may be most adversely impacted.
20  In this case,
good public policy is undermined to the extent “friendly regulators” are acting more in the
industry’s interest rather than that of consumers.
The FDIC’s program was euphemistically titled “Reducing Burden on Banks and the
Public” (FDIC, 2002B).   It appears, however, that all of the proposed reductions will likely
benefit banks and will only benefit the public under the usually unrealistic assumption that cost
reductions are passed on to them.
Part of the FDIC’s actions under this program was to fold their Division of Consumer and
Compliance Affairs, which has been independent since 1991, into the Division of Supervision.
That one policy shift alone has significant CRA ramifications, because the Division of
Consumer and Compliance Affairs under Steve Cross is the informal CRA regulatory nerve
center.  To the extent that Division is reduced in importance or worse yet consolidated into
another one suggests a non–CRA and more generally non–consumer mindset at the FDIC.
The OTS budget cuts received much more interest because that agency has long been
rumored to be a candidate for consolidation into the OCC, also a part of the Department of the
Treasury.   The OTS has lost money every year since 1998, and expected losses in 2002 were
expected to be nearly $2 million (Blackwell and Garver, 2002).  Also, the OTS has been reeling
from bad PR after a few spectacular thrift failures.
Assessment income at the OTS has dropped markedly during the past decade as the number
of thrifts fell by more than half.  The OTS responded by raising fees and examination charges.
This angered many thrifts causing some to convert to banks.  The recent conversion of one of its
larger members (Cleveland’s Charter One Financial) to an OCC bank, reportedly reduced
assessment income at the OTS by $4.2 million annually and caused their projected 2002
operating deficit to swell from $2 to $5 million (Garver, 2002).
                                           
20 The fact that the new heads of both the OTS and FDIC are ex–bankers is not unimportant, because the
end result of these current activities may be a regulatory– distorted CRA Triangle like Figure 2.53
The vulnerability of the OTS to the loss of another large thrift calls into question the
continued viability of this agency as an effective regulator in the public interest.  Using
September 30, 2001 asset totals, there are three other thrifts larger than the $37.2 Charter One,
with the $185.7 billion and growing Washington Mutual (WAMU) being the largest by far.
WAMU is also the nation’s third largest subprime mortgage lender.
Considering that the OTS probably could not survive as an independent agency with the
defection of WAMU to a competitive agency, how can OTS be an effective regulator of that
giant thrift?  Will the OTS really tell them what they think or will the agency be more concerned
about upsetting them and losing them as a “customer”?  Who wants to be the OTS examiner
willing to say “no” to WAMU, especially in a sensitive area such as subprime lending?  It is not
inappropriate to ask the question: Does the OTS regulate WAMU or does WAMU regulate the
OTS?  These are important public policy questions that must be answered, especially as WAMU
keeps growing and the OTS keeps shrinking.
The OTS unveiled a restructuring plan in April 2002 to enable it to remain as an
independent agency.  This involved a 20% staff cut to about 930 employees, with compliance
examiners being reduced more than three times the rate of safety and soundness ones.
Significantly, the OTS eliminated separate compliance exams and examiners.  In a stunning
change in bank regulatory policy, the OTS called for thrifts to conduct a “self–evaluation” of
their compliance before examiners arrived for the new consolidated exam.
The OTS claimed this approach would “place emphasis on institutions, not the regulator, to
ensure compliance with all existing laws, including consumer protection statutes” (Heller,
2002).  The latter statutes include the CRA and about 25 other laws such as Truth–in–Lending,
Truth–in–Savings, and many more.
This OTS statement, in addition to being what Congressman LaFalce called a “complete
abrogation of the mandate your agency has been given by Congress” (Heller, 2002), is nothing
less than a breakdown of the CRA Triangle.  This is also the best justification yet for why this
desperately struggling agency, like the troubled thrifts it used to regulate, should be merged into
the OCC or perhaps made a division within it.  Mutual institutions and other specialized thrift
lenders regulated by the OTS would continue to coexist with their stock counterparts.
The only thing worse than a compliance self–evaluation is no compliance law at all, which
was the case prior to 1977 for CRA.  Moreover, we have learned from past experience that CRA
is best monitored and enforced with specialized compliance examiners and separate exams.54
Specialized CRA examiners first existed at the FED in 1977 with the passage of that law.
The other agencies, which operate under tighter budgetary restrictions than the money–creating
FED, did not follow until and after 1989, CRA’s watershed year.  The OTS developed its
specialized compliance program in 1989; it was followed by the FDIC in 1991 and the OCC a
few years later.
A comparison of CRA ratings for the 15-month period both before and after the creation of
the OTS specialized compliance function in 1989 shows dramatic results (Thomas, 1993).
There was a roughly six–fold increase in the percentage of below–average ratings which jumped
from 3.7% before the specialized program to 22.5% after it.  The comparable proportion of
above–average ratings decreased from 11.3% to 9.4%.
The differences were even more dramatic by removing the initial “transition” quarter under
the new system, since the proportion of below– and above–average ratings for the 12 months
after the change was 25.0% and 2.5%, respectively.  This would mean a nearly seven–fold
increase and nearly five–fold decrease in the percentage of below– and above–average ratings,
respectively.
This evidence, although but for one federal regulator, suggests that the use of specialized
compliance examiners results in much stricter enforcement of CRA defined in terms of a greater
percentage of below–average and a lesser percentage of above–average ratings.
Based upon this experience, the recent shift by both the FDIC and OTS away from
specialized compliance examiners and exams may result in the opposite effect, namely less
strict enforcement of CRA.  This is most likely to be the case with the OTS with its planned
self–evaluation format, where the emphasis will be on the institutions not the regulators to
ensure regulatory compliance.  Less strict enforcement of CRA is not good public policy,
especially in a grade inflationary environment.
The FDIC and especially the OTS compliance consolidations suggest that it may be time to
revisit the proposal (see Tables 5 and 6) to consolidate the compliance function of all four
regulators into an FFIEC–style “super–regulator” for compliance.  This would be similar to past
proposals to create an independent “super–regulator” for safety and soundness purposes
(Thomas, 1994).
Other Key Reform Issues
Community groups are correct in asking for a fix to the rampant grade inflation problem; more55
credit for originated vs. purchased loans; a fifth “High Satisfactory” overall rating; a repeal of
the longer GLB exam cycles; and, an expansion of CRA, at least to credit unions.  This latter
recommendation is important as the proportion of home purchase loans made by CRA-covered
institutions continues to fall, with less than 30% of home purchase mortgages being subject to
intensive CRA review (Harvard University, 2002).
Many of the CRA reforms championed by community groups are found in The CRA
Modernization Act of 2001.   According to NCRC, they have been the “lead organization” for
the introduction of this proposed legislation (NCRC, 2002B).  The congressional sponsors of
this proposal are essentially the same members who signed the above–referenced “NCRC
Sample Letter on the CRA ANPR,” that was reprinted on October 16, 2001 on congressional
letterhead and submitted to the regulators as a CRA reform comment.
This legislation would extend CRA to insurance companies, securities firms, and holding
company affiliates.  This proposed legislation also contains CRA rating penalties for institutions
engaging in predatory lending; a fifth overall “High Satisfactory” rating; a repeal of the longer
CRA exam cycles of GLB; and, additional data collection and reporting requirements.
Among the most controversial portions of this proposal is an effort to make CRA a race–
based law and a repeal of the GLB sunshine requirements.  For these and other reasons, there is
little chance that this proposal will be enacted into law.
The best way to “modernize” CRA is to reform it in a manner responsive to all interests in
the CRA Triangle, and it is respectfully suggested that the recommendations in Table 9 are
optimal in this regard.
CONCLUSION
CRA’s success has been in its simplicity, and this was somewhat forgotten during the previous
1993–95 reform process with the creation of separate Investment and Service Tests on top of the
lending ones.  Good public policy in CRA must be focused on LMI lending, the purpose of the
1977 law.
As was the case with the last reform process, the bank regulators, Congress, and the
Administration hopefully will see to it that the on-going dynamic tension between industry and
community interests will result in balanced reforms.56
It is more important than ever that this important public policy deliberation be conducted
with a full view of the potential conflicts and constraints of each of the corners of the CRA
Triangle as described above.  Many of these issues did not exist during the last reform process,
but they are most relevant today.
It is respectfully suggested that the reform recommendations in Table 9, especially the
streamlined large retail bank exam, are optimal in the sense that they represent an objective and
balanced perspective of both community and industry interests with full recognition of all
relevant conflicts and constraints.57
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The CRA TriangleFigure 2
FED–Distorted CRA TriangleFigure 3
Top Ten New CRA Mistakes in the CRA Triangle
TOP TEN NEW CRA MISTAKES BY COMMUNITY GROUPS
1.   "Selling out" by publicly supporting mergers of banks that have "bought" the group (and its integrity)
2.   Using direct or indirect "extortion" techniques to obtain direct or indirect funding for a community group in exchange for
not protesting a merger or other activity
3.   Being the first "ambulance-chasing" community group to rush in to "cut a deal" with a big bank announcing a merger and
then publicly supporting it
4.   Not publicly disclosing all direct and indirect sources of funds (hard and "soft" money) from a bank or its affiliate
5.   Indiscriminately attacking all banks as being "bad guys," without making a legitimate attempt to identify the good and
truly outstanding CRA banks that are making a difference
6.   Focusing exclusively on CRA and fair lending issues without being mindful of the public policy implications of critical "big-
picture" financial institution topics
7.   Concentrating on minority rather than LMI lending data in CRA (as compared to fair lending) analyses
8.   Not taking a serious stand challenging a merger or other bank activity which the group truly believes is counter to the
public interest
9.   Representing oneself as a community group activist or leader when the real goal is personal advancement or some other
non-community agenda
10. Failing to organize and support a truly independent and non-industry funded national bank consumer advocacy
organization
TOP TEN NEW CRA MISTAKES BY REGULATORS
1.   Forgetting that federal bank regulators must first and foremost "regulate and enforce" the (CRA) law
2.   Getting far too close and friendly to certain banks
3.   Misallocating resources among the four regulators
4.   Engaging in a CRA "competition in laxity" with other regulators
5.   Allowing personal subjectivities to cloud and sometimes cover up the facts
6.   Permitting the ultimate new CRA loophole of approving any "certain special purpose bank" CRA exemption
7.   Falling into the credit allocation and unnecessary government intervention trap by requiring higher and more lending and
other goals for strategic plan approvals.
8.   Instead of doing too little in the area of CRA and fair lending enforcement, going off the deep end by doing way too much
9.   Forgetting the focus of the new CRA on LMI borrowers vs. areas and very small (below $100,000 in revenues) and small
businesses and farms vs. mid–sized and large ones
10. Ignoring the principle of "fair banking" in the merger process
TOP TEN NEW CRA MISTAKES BY BANKS
1.  Spending more time on CRA "bashing" than CRA compliance
2.  Choosing the strategic plan option or failing to withdraw a plan once it has been submitted
3.   A small bank, even one with low loan–to–deposit or other ratios, choosing anything but the streamlined small bank exam
4.   Truly special-purpose banks failing to apply for a LPB or WB designation
5.   Not preparing an internal self-assessment using the detailed new CRA exam procedures
6.   Improperly "managing" the new CRA exam process
7.   Inappropriate handling of legitimate CRA public file requests
8.  Not integrating the Qualified Investment test into the bank's overall investment and corporate contributions plan
9.  Misallocating compliance budgets
10.  Letting CRA "run the bank" instead of running the bank according to its business plan and complying with CRA
Source: Chapter 16, The CRA Handbook (McGraw–Hill, 1998).Table 1
Comparison of Old and “New” CRA Proposals and Final 1995 Regulations
"Old" CRA Regulations December 1993 Proposal September 1994 Proposal May 1995 Final "New"
CRA Regulations
One test with 12 assessment factors
applies to all institutions.
Separate tests for small and
large retail institutions.
Separate tests for small and
large retail as well as
wholesale and limited-purpose
institutions.
Separate tests for small and large retail
as well as wholesale and limited-
purpose institutions.
No streamlined assessment method
for smaller institutions.
Independent banks and thrifts
with total assets of under $250
million or members of a holding
company with total banking
and thrifts assets of less than
$250 million could be
evaluated under streamlined
The streamlined assessment
method would be used for
evaluating small institutions,
unless the bank or thrift
requests an alternative
assessment method or is
operating under an approved
Independent banks and thrifts with total
assets of under $250 million or
members of a holding company with
total banking and thrift assets of less
than $1billion would be evaluated under
streamlined procedures,
Procedures, if eligible.  Under
the lending test, a 60 percent
loan-to-deposit ratio and a
good loan mix, among other
things, would be presumed
"satisfactory".
Strategic plan.  The loan mix
and 60 percent loan-to-deposit
presumptive ratio for a
"satisfactory" rating would be
eliminated.
if eligible.  The streamlined method
would be used for evaluating small
institutions, unless they request an
alternative assessment method or are
operating under an approved strategic
plan.








service—for all large retail
institutions.
Three assessment tests—lending,
investment, and service—for all large
retail institutions.




under the investment test.
Wholesale and limited-purpose
institutions evaluated primarily
under a new community
development test.
Wholesale and limited-purpose
institutions evaluated primarily under a
new community development test.
No alternative assessment methods Institutions could elect
evaluation based on a
preapproved two-year strategic
plan developed by the bank or
thrift with input from the local
community.
Strategic plan option is revised
to provide greater clarification
of plan development process,
provisions for community input,
approval standards and goal
specifications.  Maximum plan
term is lengthened to five
years, with annual interim
Measurable goals required.
Strategic plan option is retained.
Institutions required to describe informal
efforts to seek public suggestions.
Institutions may elect alternative
assessment method if it fails to meet




Determination of overall rating is
subjective without any weighting of
assessment factors.
For retail institutions, the rating
under the lending test would
form the basis for the
composite rating; the rating
could then be increased or
decreased based on
extraordinarily weak or strong
performance under the service
and investment tests.
A retail institution must be
rated satisfactory or better
under the lending test to
receive an overall rating of
satisfactory.  The effect of the
service and investment test on
the overall rating would no
longer be limited to situations
where service or investment
A retail institution must be rated low
satisfactory or better under the lending
test to receive an overall rating of
satisfactory.  The effect of the service
and investment tests on the overall
rating is not limited to situations where
service or investment performance is
extraordinarily weak or strong.
performance is extraordinarily
weak or strong.
Institutions assessed on their method
of delineating the “local community”.
The “delineated community” is defined
as the contiguous area surrounding
each office or group of offices.
Geographic area around each
office or group of offices where
an institution makes the bulk of
its loans would define its
“service area”.  Service area
must be broad enough to
include low-and moderate-
income (LMI) areas. Institutions
The “service area” of a retail
institution would have to
include the local areas around
its deposit taking facilities in
which it has originated or has
outstanding a significant
number of loans and all other
areas equidistant from those
The “assessment area” of a retail
institution would have to include the
local areas around its deposit taking
facilities in which it has originated or
purchased a substantial portion of its
loans.  Assessment areas must consist
generally of one or more MSAs or
contiguous political subdivisions and
providing services in multiple
MSAs or across state lines
would have separate service
areas for each market.
facilities.  Service areas must
include entire census tracts
and block numbering areas.
The LMI requirement is
removed.  Institutions not
assessed on method of service
area delineation.
must include full census tracts and block
numbering areas.  Institutions not
assessed on method of assessment
area delineation.
(Continued)Table 1 (Continued)
"Old" CRA Regulations December 1993 Proposal September 1994 Proposal May 1995 Final "New"
CRA Regulations
No market share provisions. A “market share screen” under
the lending test would establish
a rebuttable presumption that
an institution’s CRA
performance was at a certain
level based on market share of
loans in middle-income and
upper-income areas compared
to market share of loans in
Explicit market share language
has been eliminated from the
regulation.  Market share
analysis is one of a broad
variety of comparisons that
examiners would use where
appropriate in evaluating
performance under the lending
test.
Explicit market share language has
been eliminated from the regulation.
Market share analysis is one of a broad
variety of comparisons that examiners
would use where appropriate in




Institutions are required to prepare
lengthy CRA statements by an actively
participating board and prepare
documentation of meetings,
marketing, outreach, and credit needs
ascertainment efforts.
Emphasis is placed on
performance over process—
institutions would no longer be
required to devote resources to
“documenting the files.”
Emphasis would remain on
performance over process.
Emphasis would remain on performance
over process.
Enforcement tools limited to denial or
conditioning of corporate applications
filed by institutions with poor CRA
performance or substantial unresolved
CRA protests.
In addition to taking CRA
performance into account when
acting on applications,
regulators would enforce CRA
compliance in the same
manner as any other regulation
and could impose formal
enforcement actions for
“substantial noncompliance”
In addition to taking CRA
performance into account when
acting on applications,
regulators would enforce CRA
compliance in the same
manner as any other regulation
and could impose formal
enforcement actions for
“substantial noncompliance”
December 1994 DOJ opinion prevents
imposition of formal enforcement
actions.  Consequently, enforcement
tools limited to denial or conditioning of
corporate applications filed by
institutions with poor CRA performance.
Automatic downgrading of third “needs
to improve" rating eliminated.
ratings (which would be
automatic upon the third
consecutive "needs to improve"
or lower rating.)
ratings (which would be
automatic upon the third
consecutive "needs to improve"
or lower ratings.)
No publication of scheduled CRA
exams.
Bank regulators required to
publish quarterly scheduled
CRA exams.
Quarterly published lists of
scheduled CRA exams
retained.
Quarterly published lists of  scheduled
CRA exams retained.
No race or gender data collected for
consumer, small business, or small
farm loans.
No race or gender data
collected for consumer, small
business, or small farm loans.
Large banks and thrifts would
have to collect race, ethnicity
and gender data on small
business and small farm loans.
No race or gender data collected for
consumer, small business, or small farm
loans.
No data collected and reported on the
geographic distribution of loans or the
race, ethnicity and gender of
borrowers, other than data on
mortgages reported pursuant to the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA).
Large banks and thrifts would
be required to collect and
report data on the geographic
distribution of housing,
consumer,  small business and
farm loans, and on loan
applications, denials,
originations, purchases, sales
and retirements. They would
Agencies would base their
analysis of mortgages lending
on the data already reported
under HMDA.  However, large
institutions reporting under
HMDA, as well as small
institutions who elect
evaluation under the lending,
investment and service tests,
Agencies would base their analysis of
mortgage lending on the data already
reported under HMDA.  However, large
institutions reporting under HMDA, as
well as small institutions who elect
evaluation  under the lending,
investment and service tests, would also
be required to report data on home
mortgage loans made outside of  MSAs.
also report data on the size of
the businesses to which loans
were made.  These new
reporting requirements would
be in addition to existing HMDA
reporting requirements and
Call Report requirements for
small business and farm loans.
would also be required to
report data on home mortgage
loans made outside of MSAs.
Large banks and thrifts would
collect and report certain data
on the geographic distribution
of and the race, ethnicity and
gender of small business and
Large banks and thrifts (and small ones
that elect such evaluation) must collect
and report certain data on the
geographic distribution of small
business and small farm borrowers.
These data must be reported by loan
size and include an indication of
whether the business or farm had gross
small farm borrowers who have
loans that are currently
aggregated on bank Call
Reports.  Some data would be
reported by loan size and
would include an indication of
whether the business or farm
had gross annual revenues of
more or less than $1 million.
annual revenues of more or less than $1
million. The agencies rather than
institutions will prepare annual and
business loan data by geography for
each reporting institution and aggregate
statements for each MSA and the non-
MSA portion of each state.  Although
there are no reporting requirements for
consumer lending, an institution with a
Aggregate data on small
business and small farm loans
and community development
loans would be included in an
institution’s Public file.  The
agencies would not make any
substantial majority of its business of
this type will have such lending
evaluated under the lending test.
aggregate data available to the
public.
Source: The CRA Handbook (McGraw–Hill, 1998).Table 2
Comparison of “Old” and “New” CRA
Assessment Factors and Performance Standards
“Old” CRA New CRA








Assessment Factor Lending Performance
Assessment Criteria
Lending Test CD Loans Lending Goals




Loan-to-deposit ratio Lending activity levels




development needs in AA
Measurable goals for
helping to meet AA credit
needs, particularly those




% loans in AA % loans in AA Goals must be responsive
to AA characteristics:




farm size in AA
Borrower distribution by
income and business/












income people and very
small businesses in AA
Use of innovative and/or
flexible lending practices




CD lending activities Use of innovative or
complex CD loans**
Investment Test
Assessment Factor Optional Investment
Test to Upgrade
“Satisfactory” Rating
Investment Test CD Investments Investment Goals
H- Participation and









investment goals that are
responsive to AA
characteristics
























“Old” CRA New CRA








Assessment Factor Optional Service Test to
Upgrade “Satisfactory”
Rating
Service Test CD Services Service  Goals





credit availability in AA
Accessibility of delivery
systems to all portions of
the AA
Preferably measurable




















Level of CD services Level of  CD services*
Use of innovative or
complex CD services**
Miscellaneous Tests
D- Practices intended to
discourage loan
applications
Practices reviewed but not
rated
Practices reviewed but not
rated
Practices reviewed but not
rated





Practices reviewed but not
rated
Practices reviewed but not
rated
Practices reviewed but not
rated
Practices reviewed but not
rated
L- Other factors regarding
credit needs
Record of taking action on
substantiated complaints
Response to complaints
reviewed but not rated
Response to complaints
reviewed but not rated
Response to complaints
reviewed but not rated
















































area not evaluated as
separate performance




area not evaluated as
separate performance




area not evaluated as
separate performance




area not evaluated as
separate performance
criteria but must meet
stated requirements
* Part of one performance
standard
** Part of one
performance standard
Source: The CRA Handbook (McGraw–Hill, 1998).Table 3
Excerpts From Sample “Sunshine” Filing by Selected National Banks
Reported Filings of $100,000 or More to Community Groups
2001 Reporting Cycle
Name of Bank Community Group “Sunshine” Filing
Bank of America, NA ACCION        $100,000
CPLC 100,000
The Greenlining Institute 200,000
ACORN 350,000
Enterprise Foundation 550,000
Bank of China Neighborhood Housing Services of NYC,
Inc. 400,000
Citibank, N.A. Enterprise Foundation 325,000
ACCION 345,000
NY Assn. For New Americans 125,000
First Union National Bank ACORN 100,000
Fleet Boston Financial Initiative for a Competitive Inner City 150,000
MA. Affordable Housing Alliance 298,500
Union Bank of CA, N.A. Habitat for Humanity 125,000
Neighborhood Housing Services
(various) 332,400
The Greenlining Institute 130,000
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
(various) Habitat for Humanity 470,604
National Community Reinvestment
Coalition 250,000
Note: Above filings for selected community groups by selected national banks.
Source: OCC CRA Sunshine report as of October 17, 2001Table 4
Excerpts From Sample ”Sunshine” Filing by Community Group
The Greenlining Coalition
Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 1999
                          Financial Services Contributions
Name of Bank or Thrift Contributions
Bank of America* $209,500
Cal Fed 69,500
FNMA Foundation 59,500
Washington Mutual Foundation 150,000
Manufacturer’s Bank 4,750




Bank of the West 39,500
Total Financial Services Contributions $906,250
*Form 990 also reports notes payable to Bank of
America Foundation at 3% APR.
Selected Financial Indicators
Total Financial Services Contributions (above)  $906,250
Non–bank firms (e.g., AT&T)    290,500
“Other Contributions”      75,590
Total Contributions 1,272,340
Receipts From Program Fees, Conference
Revenue, and Other Sources 1,040,727
Other Revenue    214,323
Total Revenue 2,527,390
Total Expenses 1,954,625
Note: Compensation and Contributions to Top
           Three Employees:
Executive Director    137,146
Legal Counsel    140,958
Asst. Executive Director      82,500
Excess (“Net Income”) Contribution to Net Assets
(“Net Worth”) For Tax Exempt    572,765
Contributions to Minority and Diversity Programs
Bank or Thrift Contributions Purpose Amount
Citigroup Diversity  $9,500
Citigroup General Funds (Conference)    5,000
Bay View Capital General Funds (Conference)  15,000
Washington Mutual Leadership Academy, Economic Development, and
Diversity
120,000
Washington Mutual General Funds (Conference)   30,000
Cal Fed General Funds (Conference)   30,000
Cal Fed Leadership Academy and Diversity Partnership   50,000
Total $259,500
Source: June 15, 2001 Sunshine Regulations 2000 Annual Report to OTS, including IRS Form 990
for Tax Exempt OrganizationsTable 5
CRP Proposals for CRA Reform*
1. Expand CRA to Nonbanks
A. Expand CRA to credit unions using same arguments as to why CRA is required for
small community banks (p.352)
B.  Develop CRA-type requirements for non-depository financial institutions (pp.352-54)
(1) Money market and other mutual funds
(2) Mortgage bankers
(3) Consumer finance companies
(4) Insurance companies
(5) Other financial intermediaries (e.g., Merrill Lynch, American
Express, pension funds, etc.)
2. More Objective, Quantitative, and Structured CRA Performance Evaluations
A. Comparative Ratio Analysis (p.354)
(1) Loan-to-deposit ratios (relative to loan quality)
(2) Percent of loans in delineated community
(3) Percent of loans in low- and moderate-income (“LMI”) areas
(4) “CRA loans” as percent of all loans and assets
(5) Other ratios
B. Comparative HMDA analysis (p.354)
C. Loan analysis (pp. 354-55)
(1) Minimum loan amounts, if any
(2) Special fees or unfavorable terms on small loans, if any
(3) Average loans vs. deposit size
(4) Government loan programs offered and amount extended
(5) Other calculations
D. Checklist (“yes/no”) questions (p.355)
(1) Lifeline checking?
(2) Free government check cashing?
(3) Office closings in low/mod areas?
(4) Any technical or substantive compliance violations?
(5) Other questions
3. Greater Consistency in CRA Regulation and Enforcement Among the Four Regulators
and Among Different Regions of the Same Regulator
A. More consistent CRA ratings (p.355)
B. More consistent CRA enforcement efforts (P.355)
C. More consistent length and style of public performance evaluations (pp. 355-56)
D. Modified CRA standards for specialized banks (p.356)
(1) Wholesale banks
(2) Foreign banks
(3)        Credit card banks
(Continued)
(4)        Not private or business niche banksTable 5 (Continued)
                CRP Proposals for CRA Reform*
E. Publicly disclosed CRA appeals process, preferably centralized at FFIEC, available
for banks and community groups (p.357)
Note: “Safe harbor” or similar exemption not considered as a feasible option.
4. Fifth “Good” CRA Rating and Rating Guidelines
A. Five-tier CRA rating system with ‘good” rating added (pp. 357-58)
B. General guidelines on CRA ratings distribution of above-average, average, and
below-average categories.  For example, is current 10%- 80%- 10% appropriate or
should it be 25%- 50%- 25%?  (p.358)
C. Guidelines on minimum and maximum CRA ratings for assessment factor D and F
compliance violations.  For example, outstanding banks have no violations of any
type and banks with “substantive” violations rate no better than needs improvement
(p.358)
D.   Guidelines on minimum and maximum CRA rating based on key ratios.  For
example, persistent and unjustified very low net loan-to-deposit ratios (such as 15-
25% or less) result in below-average rating (pp.369-70)
E. Guidelines on what does and does not qualify for CRA “credit.”  For example, CRA
credit for contributions to low/mod housing organizations but not general charities
(p.370)
5.  Specialized Compliance Examiners at OCC (pp. 358-59)
6.  Aggressive Training of Compliance Examiners in CRA and Safety and Soundness
Through Individual Agency and Joint FFIEC Programs
A. Require CRA examiners to read other public performance evaluations (p.359)
B.  Require CRA examiners to accompany safety and soundness examiners on a
rotating basis for training (p.359)
7. Centralize All Compliance Functions in New Federal “Super-Regulator”
A. Pilot CRA joint examination program through FFIEC with representatives from four
agencies (pp.359-60)
B. CRA “swat team” approach of examining all banks and thrifts in one community at
same time with interviews, seminars, and publicly disclosed ratings (p.360)
C. Published compliance schedule with exam frequency being a function of last CRA
rating: 24 months for outstanding rating; 18 months for new “good” rating; 12
months for satisfactory rating; 9 months for needs improvement rating; and, 6
months for substantial noncompliance rating (p.360)
D. Published no-charge weekly listing of completed CRA ratings (p.360)
E. Toll-free 800 “hotline” for any CRA questions or complaints (p.360)
8. Change CRA Emphasis From “Including” Low- and Moderate-Income “Areas” to
“Especially” Low- and Moderate-Income “People” (pp.361-62)
(Continued)Table  5 (Continued)
CRP Proposals for CRA Reform*
9. Eliminate Unnecessary and Irrelevant CRA Documentation and Paperwork
A. Reevaluate CRA public file requirements (p.362)
B. Reevaluate CRA statement requirements (p.362)
C. See CRA Cost/Benefit Matrix for distinction between those activities that primarily
benefit CRA rating (i.e., documentation) and those that also benefit the community
(p.331 and p.362)
10. Consider “CRA Assessment” Proposal- A Major Restructuring of CRA System With
Specific Monetary Incentives for Good Performance and Disincentives for Bad
Performance (pp.362-63 and pp.367-71)
11.   Expanded Disclosure of CRA Ratings and Performance Evaluations
A. Objective study (e.g., by General Accounting Office) to determine extent of relevant
nonconfidential information being excluded from CRA public performance
evaluations but included in confidential portion of examinations (pp.363-64)
B.  Regularly (e.g., monthly or quarterly) published listing of the results of the
evaluations of the Community Support Statements (CSS) of Federal Home Loan
Bank members (p.364)
C.  Reevaluate social costs and benefits of current CSS program at Federal Home Loan
Banks and determine if comparable program involving Fed’s discount window is
needed (pp.364-65)
D.  Future consideration of public disclosure of safety and soundness ratings and
nonconfidential portion of examinations (p. 365)
E. Require banks and regulators to maintain and make available upon request
copies of all past public (e.g., post-June 30, 1990) CRA performance evaluations
(p.365)
12.   Disclosure of Individual Assessment Factor and Performance Category Ratings in
Public Performance Evaluations so Banks and the Community Alike Will Know How a
Final Rating Was Determined (p. 365)
13.   More Timely Disclosure of CRA Ratings and Performance Evaluations
A. Require regulators to transmit completed CRA rating and performance evaluations
within specified time (e.g., 45 total days) after exit interview (p.365)
B. Require public disclosure by bank of CRA rating and performance evaluation upon
receipt of them (p. 365)
C. Require banks to publish CRA rating and availability of public performance
evaluation in local paper of wide circulation within short period (e.g., five business
days) of receipt (p.366)
D. Require regulators to publish compliance examination schedule (p.366)
(Continued)Table  5 (Continued)
CRP Proposals for CRA Reform*
14.   CRA Ratings and Performance Evaluations for Individual Banking Markets
A.  Require separate CRA ratings and performance evaluations by state, at a minimum,
             for interstate thrifts (e.g., Great Western) (p.366)
B. Require separate CRA ratings and performance evaluations by banking market for
large statewide banks if they are one of the largest (e.g., top 5) banks in the market
(pp.366-67)
15.   Publicly Disclosed Written Guidelines on Conditions for Issuing CRA-Related Informal
vs. Formal Enforcement Actions, Conditional Approvals vs. Denials of Branch and
Merger Applications, Civil Money Penalties, and Justice Department Referrals (p. 367)
*Page references refer to discussion in Community Reinvestment Performance, (CRP) by
Kenneth H. Thomas (Probus Publishing, Chicago, 1993)Table 6
The CRA Handbook (Chapter 16) Proposals for CRA Reform
1.  The most important step the four federal regulators can take to begin the elimination of the
systemic new CRA grade inflation documented here is a complete retraining of the CRA
examination force to better prepare them to do their job under the new regs.
2.   New CRA grade inflation by friendly and subjective examiners can be reduced with the
immediate implementation of a comprehensive PE quality control program, beginning with a
revised "fill-in-the-blanks" style PE with minimum data and analysis requirements.
3.  CRA should be expanded to credit unions at a minimum and gradually to other financial
institutions as well as nonfinancial companies affiliated with banks.
4. The most important step that Congress could take to improve CRA enforcement, rating and
exam consistency among regulators is to require an FFIEC-style joint compliance function.
5.   All new CRA exemptions that have been granted should be rescinded, and all other new CRA
loopholes identified in this analysis should be eliminated.
6. Federal bank regulators must open certain closed-door CRA approval and appeal processes as
well as improve the general level of disclosure of publicly available documents via regulatory
Web sites.
7. The small bank streamlined exam should be expanded to include mandatory investment and
service tests and additional disclosures and ratings similar to the large bank exam.
8.   The large retail bank exam should have additional rating component disclosures as well as the
mandatory calculation of the annual qualified investments (QIs)–to–assets or “QITA” ratio within
the investment test.
9.   The CD test for special purpose banks should be made more objective and structured along the
lines of the large retail bank exam, with the required calculation of the annual CD loans plus QIs-
to-assets or “LAQITA” ratio.
10. The plug should be pulled on the entire strategic plan option, and all banks with approved plans
should be evaluated on the basis of their back-up procedures.Table 7
Selected Bank and Thrift Industry Comments on 2002 CRA Reform
Large Retail Institutions: The Lending, Service, and Investment Tests








Large bank exam 
has increased 
compliance burden; 




activities have been 
"innovative" or 
"complex"; annual 
review of CRA 
ratings for more 
consistency among 
agencies; PE 
should clearly show 
date exam began 
and ended as well 
as review period
Treat originations and 
purchases identically;  keep 
predatory lending issues as 
part of fair lending exam 
rather than CRA exam
Eliminate and make 
investments 
substitutable for 
loans; return focus of 
CRA to credit rather 
than CD and 
investments; 
investment test is #1 








test not authorized by 
CRA;  no statutory 
authority for this test
Depends too heavily 
on branches; 
broader definition of 







No need for 
separate test; 
expand definition of 









investment test;  
increase 
independent 
small bank size 






in definition of 
special purpose 
banks so more 
banks can use 
this test; consider 
this flexible test 






















provide banks with 
more information on 

















End current data 
collection 
requirements or 
apply only to banks 
with 250 or more 
reportable loans; 
strongly opposes any 
more data collection 
or reporting; current 
small business and 














Grant same weight to 
purchased loans as 
originated ones
Must be eliminated, 
revised, or its relative 
importance reduced 
or even made optional 
for "extra credit"; 
ignores type of 
investment by giving 








$1 billion and 
holding 
companies to $5 











at regional or 
local level









credit for loans 
and investments 
outside AA as 






Data collecting and 
maintaining public 







uncertainty of CRA 









activities should not 
be required for 
Outstanding rating
Large bank exam should be 
primarily based on qualifying 
loans with the option of 
investment or service 
activity; maintain credit for 
originations as well as 
purchases; do not include 
predatory lending concerns 
in PE as they should be 
covered in fair lending exam.
Remove as required 
test; expand scope of 
qualified investments
Raise small 





elements of PC as 
early as possible






banks making a 



























Data Collection and 
Maintenance of 
Public FilesTable 7
Selected Bank and Thrift Industry Comments on 2002 CRA Reform
Large Retail Institutions: The Lending, Service, and Investment Tests











































very good but 
smaller projects to 
be overlooked
Less quantitative emphasis, 
especially in areas with 
limited CRA product; better 
developed benchmarks in 
evaluations; review lending 
for harmful or abusive 
practices in context of fair 
lending exam; letters of 
credit should count equally 
as loans; equal treatment of 
purchased and originated 
loans
Ineffective and often 
problematic; combine 
with lending test OR 
replace with CD test; 
greater recognition of 
credit for written–off 
equity investments
Largely been 














under both HMDA 
and CD
Should be option 











for limited CRA 
product; must be 
more consistent 
among agencies; 
components of PC 
should be shared 
with bank to create a 
dialog
Current approach 








No changes to data 
collection; systems in 
place and function 
well; public file only 
at main office since 
minimal requests 
(five or less per year) 







No major rewrite; 






to shift among 
investment, 
lending, and service 
tests to meet local 
needs
Equal treatment of 
purchases and originations; 
consistent consideration of 
letters of credit
Limited number of 
investments, and 
heavy competition for 











Credit for more 
activities, even 
non–LMI related; 
credit for non–AA 
CD activities if meet 
AA needs
Greater flexibility 
in definition of 
special purpose 
banks
More and better use Credit for lending 










compliance cost and 
time, but they are 
coming down with 








Keep at 50%; include letters 






with CD loans; 
evaluate as part of 
new CD test
Reduce to 20% New test at 30% Must be given more 
consideration
Credit for all 
activities outside 









reporting is huge 












training; public file 





is out of reach for 
small banks
Prefer identical treatment of 
purchased and originated 
loans, but possible 
discounting of purchased 
loans far outside AA
Less emphasis on 
investments and more 
on loans; one 
recommended 
solution is elimination 
of investment test and 
making it optional for 
extra credit; credit for 
investments outside 
of AA; expand 
qualified investments 




such as the internet 
and special purpose 
deposit accounts; 
credit for CD 
services even if not 
financially related
Better definition of 
CD activities; credit 
for any economic 
development 
activity, even if not 
LMI related
Top priority is 
increase in size 
of small 
independent 











More fully shared 
with banks before 






greater latitude to 
designate LMI 
areas
Eliminate since costs 
cannot justify benefitsTable 7
Selected Bank and Thrift Industry Comments on 2002 CRA Reform
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use innovative and 
complex criteria to 
improve rating
Eliminate as required 
benchmark and make 
use and weighting of 
it at discretion of bank
Restrict CD concept 
to investments 





assets of $1 
billion or less
AA concept is 




credit for LMI 
loans anywhere 
in state, 









for HMDA, should be 
optional; existing 








split, but most see 
no need for major 
reform but only 
"tweaking"; more 
flexibility during 





No change to current 
treatment of purchases vs. 
originations; consideration of 
letters of credit; 
consideration of "harmful" 
and "abusive" lending 
practices too subjective and 
would be very difficult and 
counterproductive
Several members 
favor elimination of 
test or at least 
subsuming in Lending 
Test so investments 
substitutable for 
loans; some members 
would like all three 
tests counted equally; 
recommends choice 
between existing 
system and a 
modified CD test that 
allows more flexibility
Credit for ATMs 
used by LMI people; 
more consideration 










feel no need to 
change, but 
some want more 








and data of minimal 
use; eliminate current 
data collection 
requirements; 
strongly oppose any 
new requirements; 
make public file 




Make more flexible and less 
reliant on quantitative 
measures; do not require 
CD investments and 
services to get a Satisfactory 
rating
Make optional and 
count investments for 
extra credit or as a 
substitute for loans; 
expand scope of 
qualified investments
Count services for 
extra credit or as a 
substitute for loans
Broaden scope of 
CD investments and 
services to benefit 
entire community 
not just LMI areas
Make easier to 





cards or car loans 
exclusively
Make easier 




on area around 
offices; exclude 
areas where 
bank has no 
presence
Discontinue CRA 
reporting of small 
business loans; 
reports of little value 
and extremely costly
Source: Individual organizationsTable 8
Selected Community Group Comments on 2002 CRA Reform
Large Retail Institutions: The Lending, Service, and Investment Tests




ACORN Upgrade ratings 
standards to reduce 
grade inflation
Consider quality as well 
as quantity of loans; 
penalize lenders with 
originated or purchased 
loans with abusive or 
predatory terms; evaluate 
pricing to make sure 
prime borrowers do not 
have subprime rates or 
terms; count purchases 
much less than 
originations
Maintain; more 
weight to grants; no 
credit for MBS with 
underlying predatory 
features
Maintain; quantify use of 
low–cost banking 
services such as lifeline 
banking accounts; banks 
partnering with check 
cashers or payday 
lenders receive below 















AAs based on 
substantial 







Report current data 
quarterly rather than 
annually; separate 








Fifth "High Satisfactory" 
overall rating;  Low 
Satisfactory banks must 
submit public 
improvement plan; use 
qualitative factors only to 
improve satisfactory 
rating; revise CRA to 
focus on race as well as 
income
Credit for multi–family 
lending in low income 
areas only if to LMI 
tenants; no loan should 
count more than once; 
penalize any predatory or 
payday lending; little to 
no credit for subprime 
lending
Maintain test; loan 
purchases get credit 
only under 
Investment Test; 
most credit for 
contributions and 
less credit for MBS 
Consider fees in service 
test; better description of 
CD services in PE; 
banks must provide 
lifeline banking products
Include race as 
factor in defining 







Test for all small 
banks; require 
CD lending and 
investments for 
Outstanding 
rating for banks in 
$100–250 million 
range
Do not expand 
definition of 
banks here; do 









make at least 20 
community 
contacts per MSA
Banks that lend 
or take deposits 
from a 
significant 





LMI to non–LMI 
aggregate 










data; report CD loan 





Too much emphasis on 
performance of large 
banks in urban centers 
vs. rural areas; increased 
use of community group 
contacts during exams
Credit to move subprime 
borrowers to prime 
market; deny CRA credit 
for any predatory loans
Maintain  Maintain but increase 
quantitative analysis and 
rigor
Do not develop 
separate CD test; 







should be in PE; 
















information on PC 
to make PEs 
more useful
Require AA to 





Once a bank 




then the activity 




business data in 
HMDA format; 
report CD loans on 
census tract basis; 
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Conduct CRA, fair 
lending, and safety and 
soundness exams 
concurrently; incentives to 
increase prime lending; 
don't provide excess 
credit for "innovative" 
programs; fifth overall 
High Satisfactory rating; 
Low Satisfactory or lower 
rating requires 
improvement plan with 
public comment period; 
apply GLB restriction that 
all banks with failing 
ratings cannot expand 
into the securities or 
insurance business to 
both acquiring and 
acquired banks; public 




minorities in exam like 
LMI borrowers; 
purchased loans not 
counted as much as 
originated ones; no credit 
for payday lending
Disclosure of checking 
and savings accounts 













which a great 









data to include 
APRs and fees; lift 
Reg B prohibition 
on reporting of race 
and gender small 
business data; 
report aggregated 






Conduct CRA, fair 
lending, and safety and 
soundness exams 
concurrently; emphasis 
on quantitative criteria; 
"innovative" programs do 
not compensate for 
otherwise bad 
performance; fifth "High 
Satisfactory" overall 
rating;  Low Satisfactory 
banks must submit public 
improvement plan; GLB 
expansion restriction due 
to poor CRA ratings 
applies to both banks in a 
deal; public hearings to 
discuss CRA reform
Penalize lenders for 
making predatory loans; 
subprime lenders must 
show that no credit 
worthy borrower was 
offered subprime loan; 
purchased loans not 
given same weight as 
originated ones
Maintain as there is 
a need for equity 
investments in LMI 
areas
Data on number of 
checking and savings 
accounts by income and 
minority status and 
location; include fees 
and cost of deposit 
services; CRA credit for 










which a great 
majority of a 
bank's loans are 
made
CRA exams 




HMDA analysis of 
lending to minorities 
must be included; 
supports FED's 
proposed addition 
of rate and fee data 
on HMDA reports; 
race and gender 
data on small 
business loansTable 8
Selected Community Group Comments on 2002 CRA Reform
Large Retail Institutions: The Lending, Service, and Investment Tests
































Add fifth overall rating of 
High Satisfactory; overall 
ratings of Low 
Satisfactory or less 
require public 




prompt disclosure of CRA 
appeals; emphasize 
quantitative approach; 
conduct CRA, fair 
lending, and safety and 
soundness exams 
concurrently
Subprime lending does 
not count as much as 
prime lending; severe 
penalties for any 
predatory lending; explicit 
consideration of 
minorities just like LMI 
people and areas
Needed since LMI 





benchmark such as 
ratio of CD 
investments to 
assets; also use 
ratio of nonprofit 
grants to assets; 
more credit to 
investments with 
better LMI impact
Must be more rigorous 
due to grade inflation; 
require new data on 
savings and checking 
accounts; require branch 
distribution data in PEs; 
include data on cost of 
services; no credit for 
payday lending; only 
allow credit for 
alternative delivery 
systems or CD services 








no expansion of 






Do not allow any 
more banks to 






















Eliminate  Regulators should 
inform community 
groups of names 
of banks when 
seeking public 
input; regulators 







which a great 





where bank or 
affiliates have 
branches, 
ATMs, or more 
















data to include 
APRs and fees; lift 
Reg B prohibition 
on reporting of race 
and gender small 
business data; 
report aggregated 






Use qualitative factors 
only to upgrade bank if 
high satisfactory rating; 
Outstanding rating denied 
if bank rated Needs to 
Improve on any 
component test; 
Satisfactory rating only if 
no Substantial 
Noncompliance rating in 
any component test
Qualitative analysis of 
lending for costs and 
abusive terms; consider 
number of loans besides 
amount; originations 
given more weight than 
purchases; include 
neighborhood race data 
in geographic 
distribution; penalty for 
predatory lending but 
bonus for "referring up" 
subprime customers"
Maintain; distinguish 









Maintain; quantify use of 
low–cost banking 
services such as lifeline 
banking accounts; banks 
partnering with check 
cashers or payday 
lenders receive below 
satisfactory rating on 
Service Test; require 
more quantitative 
measures of alternative 
services
Do not make 
separate test; 
count CD credit 
under Investment 
or Lending Tests; 
narrow current 
CD definition to 





















or other fringe 
financial 
services, even if 
done outside 















be included in 
CRA exams
Report small 
business data in 
HMDA format; 
report CD loans on 
census tract basis; 
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Add fifth overall rating of 
High Satisfactory
Focus more on quality 
rather than quantity of 
lending, especially as 
related to predatory 
loans; bonus credit for 
low–cost alternatives to 
payday lending
Increase weighting 
in certain cases; 
encourage 
substantive grants or 
investments in 
nonprofits
Evaluate whether retail 
banking services easily 


















basis of location 
of deposits and 
other activities 
(e.g., define AA 
as all MSAs 
where 5% or 






affiliates in AA, 
without 
expanding 





on small business 
lending,  rural 
lending, pricing, and 






company activities related 
to covered banking 
activities; add High 
Satisfactory overall rating; 
give out more Needs to 
Improve ratings; reward 
leadership efforts by 
banks; public hearings for 
all mergers of $1 billion or 
more in assets if either 
party has below average 
component test rating 
Bonus credits for 
key grants
Include 
activities of all 
subsidiaries  
and affiliates
CRA exams should 
not be colorblind – 
include race and 
ethnic data; 
examine and report 
diversity of Board, 




Tougher overall rating 
requirements based on 
component test ratings
More weight for 
originations vs. 
purchases; include race 
as well as income 
criteria; evaluate quality 
as well as quantity of 
lending; examine 
subprime lending for 
predatory features, which 
result in low rating; 
evaluate all 








on risk and return; 




Satisfactory rating on 
this test for overall 
passing rating; consider 
distribution of bank 
accounts by income, 
race, and geography; 
Outstanding rating on 
this test requires lifeline 
banking, multiple 
delivery systems, or 
account alternatives as 
well as innovative and 
complex services; 
internet or trust banks 








qualify; bank is 
"retail" if more 
than 0.5% market 
share of any 
product
Eliminate  Consider 
community group 
input; inform both 
banks and 
community groups 




to base AA not 
just on branch 
locations but 
also on location 
of significant 







lending; at a 
minimum, 
banks should 








format to be similar 
to HMDA; require 
race and gender 
data for small 
businesses; more 
detailed CD lending 
data; require 
detailed reporting 
for investments and 
services; more 
detailed reporting of 
existing CRA data
Source: Individual community groupsTable 9
Optimal CRA Reform Recommendations
Large Retail Institutions: The Lending, Service, and Investment Tests
Lending Test Investment Test Service Test CD Activities
1.  Return focus of CRA exam and rating to LMI lending  
2.  Reduction of grade inflation through joint agency examiner education   
3.  Expansion of CRA to at least credit unions   
4.  More objective, quantitative, and structured PEs, with exception of new qualitative 
lending criterion
5.  Goal of FFIEC centralized compliance function  
6.  Greater consistency in exam and rating procedures among regulators and individual 
regions   
7.  Fifth "good" or High Satisfactory rating   
8.  More detailed rating guidelines and PE disclosure of individual performance rating 
factors (i.e., ratings matrix)   
9.  Specialized compliance examiners and staff with separate exams
10.  Continued focus on LMI areas and people with no consideration of race   
11.  Better and more timely disclosure of ratings, PEs, and appeals   
12.  No CRA exemptions for federally-insured depositories      
13.  Return to pre-GLB, more frequent, tiered exam schedule based on ratings, ranging 
from 6 months (worst rating) to 24-30 months (best rating)
1.  Addition of three new ratings factors: LMI credit–related 
investments, LMI credit–related CD services, and LMI 
credit–related retail banking services
2.  Expansion of innovative/flexible rating factor to more 
comprehensive "Qualitative Lending" one which also includes 
consideration of any predatory or other adverse LMI credit 
practices as well as "referring-up" of subprime borrowers
3.  10 rating factors evaluated under current 5 ratings (50 cells in 
ratings matrix) with ratings matrix disclosed in PE
4.  Reduced credit for purchased loans in AA vs. originated 
loans to reflect additional costs and risks associated with 
originations; mandatory PE disclosure of amount of purchased 
vs. originated loans in AA
5.   No credit for purchased loans if double counting or evidence 
of "loan swapping" among banks
6.  Continue current treatment of letters of credit with notation of 
their volume
1.  Eliminate and make part of lending test  
2.  Only consider LMI credit-related investments 
with documentation of same in PE
3.  Initially make this test a mandatory lending 
factor, with possibility of making optional as in 
case of small bank test
4.  Credit for all LMI-related qualified investments 
outside AA, as long as LMI credit needs in AA 
being met
5.  Limited credit for "over-the-counter" 
purchased LMI-related securities, especially 
MBS, bonds, and minority bank CDs with 
mandatory PE disclosure of same
6.  Credit for all LMI credit-related qualified 
investments held during review period, including 
long-maturity ones that blanket the review period
1.  Eliminate and make part 
of lending test
2.  Only consider LMI credit-
related services with 
documentation of same in 
PE
3.  Initially make this test a 
mandatory lending factor, 
with possibility of making 
optional as in case of small 
bank test
4.  Credit for all LMI-related 
CD services outside AA, as 
long as LMI credit needs in 
AA being met
1.  Part of lending test  
2.  Maintain current CD 
definitions
3.  Credit for all 
LMI–related CD activities 
outside of AA, as long as 
LMI credit needs in AA 
being met
14.  Require that both the acquirer and acquiree in a bank deal have passing (i.e., 
Satisfactory or better) overall CRA ratings
15.  Equal treatment of LMI–related outstanding loans and investments vs. new ones 
made during review period; no penalty for longer term instruments                                   
16.  Time-sensitive evaluation (and pro-rata weighting) of CRA performance over the entire 
review period, without emphasizing most recent CRA activities; limited pro-rata credit for 
any new CRA activities within six months of exam start date with disclosure of same in PE                                                     
17.  Require all community groups and coalitions involved with CRA to make sunshine 
filings disclosing details of all IRS Form 990 schedules showing contributor names and 
amounts for current and past years
18.  More fact-based documentation of conclusions in PE, including  mandatory use of 
standardized tables of performance data PEs that are as least as comprehensive as those 
developed by the OCC
19.  All agencies should adopt all 10 recommendations to improve PEs found in the OTS 
Office of Inspector General Report (see Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, 2001)
20.  Greater CRA data availability and ease of access (with optional e-mail notification list 
for specific banks or areas) from FFIEC and agency web sites with announcement of 
upcoming exams, recent ratings, related enforcement actions, reform comments, FOIA 
requests and responses, appeal files, special purpose bank designation applications, and 
GLB sunshine reports
21.  More descriptive information in all PEs about scope of exam, including starting and 
ending dates, review period, products reviewed, AAs covered, and even chief examiner's 
initials or identifying number for accountability
22.  Mandatory review and potential reform of CRA five years after the complete transition 
to the present reforms; if the reforms due out in 2002 are fully transitioned by the end of 
next year, the next reform should occur in 2008
(Continued)
General CommentsTable 9
Optimal CRA Reform Recommendations
Double current size minimum to $500 
million for independents and $2 billion 
for holding companies
1.  More consistent definitions to insure special 
purpose qualification
2.  Only consider activities that can be 
documented as LMI related
3.  Credit for LMI-related CD activities outside 
of AA, as long as LMI credit needs in AA being 
met
4.  Stricter application and disclosure of 
performance rating factors and matrix to reduce 
grade inflation
5.  Limited credit for banks electing single CD 
activity, especially purchased investments, 
when performance context dictates potential for 
additional CD activities
6.  Retain innovative and complex 
considerations, especially for banks with single 
CD activities 
1.  Eliminate SP option
2.  Banks currently under SPs 
will use elected back–up exam 
method
1.  More explicit use prior to 
and during exam as well as 
in PE
2.  Required PE description 
of how PC applied in 
weighting performance rating 
factors and the resultant 
impact on overall rating
1.  Retain existing AA approach
2.  Credit for LMI-related CD 
activities, especially LMI lending, 
outside of AA for all banks, not just 
nontraditional ones with alternative 
delivery systems, as long as local 
LMI credit needs being met
3.  PC analysis of nontraditional 
banks with alternative delivery 
systems and very small portion of 
loans in AA will result in lower 
weighting of AA loan percentage 
rating factor relative to other 
performance factors, especially 
nonlocal LMI lending
Mandatory rather than optional 
CRA treatment of affiliates
1.  Continue all existing data 
collection and reporting 
requirements
2.  Maintain current public file 
requirement
3.  Do not consider or require 
any race data under CRA
Source: K.H. Thomas, Ph.D.
Small Institution: The Streamlined 
Small Institution Evaluation
Limited Purpose and Wholesale Institutions: 
The CD Test
Data Collection and 
Maintenance of Public Files
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AGENCIES: Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Treasury (OCC); Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board); Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Office of
Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS).
ACTION: Joint advance notice of
proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The OCC, Board, FDIC, and
OTS (collectively, ‘‘we’’ or ‘‘the
agencies’’) are beginning a review of our
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
regulations. This advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPR) seeks
public comment on a wide range of
questions as part of our review. We also
welcome comments discussing other
aspects of the CRA regulations and
suggesting ways to improve the efficacy
of the regulations.
DATES: Comments must be received by
October 17, 2001.
ADDRESSES: OCC: Please direct your
comments to: Docket No. 01–16,
Communications Division, Public
Information Room, Mailstop 1–5, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250
E Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219.
You can inspect and photocopy all
comments received at that address. In
addition, you may send comments by
facsimile transmission to fax number
(202) 874–4448, or by electronic mail to
regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.
Board: Comments should refer to
Docket No. R–1112 and should be
mailed to Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551, or mailed electronically to
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
Comments addressed to Ms. Johnson
may also be delivered to the Board’s
mailroom between 8:45 a.m. and 5:15
p.m., and to the security control room
outside those hours. Both the mailroom
and the security control room are
accessible from the Eccles Building
courtyard entrance, located on 20th
Street between Constitution Avenue and
C Street, NW. Members of the public
may inspect comments in Room MP–
500 of the Martin Building between 9:00
a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays.
FDIC: Mail: Written comments should
be addressed to Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments/OES, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20429.
Delivery: Comments may be hand
delivered to the guard station at the rear
of the 550 17th Street Building (located
on F Street) on business days between
7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
Facsimile: Send facsimile
transmissions to fax number (202) 898–
3838.
Electronic: Comments may be
submitted to the FDIC electronically
over the Internet at http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
publiccomments/index.html. The FDIC
has included a page on its web site to
facilitate the submission of electronic
comments in response to this ANPR
concerning the CRA regulations (the
EPC site). The EPC site provides an
alternative to the written letter and may
be a more convenient way for you to
submit your comments or suggestions
concerning the ANPR to the FDIC. If you
submit comments through the EPC site,
your comments will receive the same
consideration that they would receive if
submitted in hard copy to the FDIC’s
street address. Like comments or
suggestions submitted in hard copy to
the FDIC’s street address, EPC site
comments will be made available in
their entirety (including the
commenter’s name and address if the
commenter chooses to provide them) for
public inspection. The FDIC, however,
will not use an individual’s name or any
other personal identifier of an
individual to retrieve records or
information submitted through the EPC
site. You will be able to view the ANPR
directly on the EPC site and provide
written comments and suggestions in
the spaces provided.
You may also electronically mail
comments to comments@fdic.gov.
Public Inspection: Comments may be
inspected and photocopied in the FDIC
Public Information Center, Room 100,
801 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC
20429, between 9:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.
on business days.
OTS: Mail: Send comments to
Regulation Comments, Chief Counsel’s
Office, Office of Thrift Supervision,
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC
20552, Attention Docket No. 2001–49.
Delivery: Hand deliver comments to
the Guard’s Desk, East Lobby Entrance,
1700 G Street, NW., from 9:00 a.m. to
4:00 p.m. on business days, Attention:
Regulation Comments, Chief Counsel’s
Office, Attention Docket No. 2001–49.
Facsimiles: Send facsimile
transmissions to FAX Number (202)
906–6518, Attention: Docket No. 2001–
49.
E-Mail: Send e-mails to
regs.comments@ots.treas.gov, Attention
Docket No. 2001–49 and include your
name and telephone number.
Public Inspection: Comments and the
related index will be posted on the OTS
Internet Site at http://
www.ots.treas.gov. In addition, you may
inspect comments at the Public
Reference Room, 1700 G Street, NW., by
appointment. To make an appointment
for access, call (202) 906–5922, send an
e-mail to public.info@ots.treas.gov, or
send a facsimile transmission to (202)
906–7755. (Prior notice identifying the
material you will be requesting will
assist us in serving you.) Appointments
will be scheduled on business days
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between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. In
most cases, appointments will be
available the next business day
following the date a request is received.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC: Karen Tucker, National Bank
Examiner, Community and Consumer
Policy Division, (202) 874–4428;
Margaret Hesse, Special Counsel,
Community and Consumer Law
Division, (202) 874–5750; or Patrick
Tierney, Attorney, Legislative &
Regulatory Activities Division, (202)
874–5090, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, 250 E Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20219.
Board: William T. Coffey, Senior
Review Examiner, (202) 452–3946;
Catherine M.J. Gates, Oversight Team
Leader, (202) 452–3946; or Kathleen C.
Ryan, Senior Attorney, (202) 452–3667,
Division of Consumer and Community
Affairs, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551.
FDIC: Deanna Caldwell, Senior Policy
Analyst, (202) 942–3366; Stephanie
Caputo, Fair Lending Specialist (202)
942–3413; or Robert Mooney, Assistant
Director, (202) 942–3378, Division of
Compliance and Consumer Affairs; or
Ann Johnson, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898–3573, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20429.
OTS: Celeste Anderson, Policy
Analyst, Compliance Policy, (202) 906–
7990; Theresa A. Stark, Project Manager,
Compliance Policy, (202) 906–7054; or
Richard Bennett, Counsel (Banking and
Finance), (202) 906–7409, Office of




The Federal financial supervisory
agencies are jointly undertaking a
review of our CRA regulations, in
fulfillment of our commitment to do so
when we adopted the current
regulations in 1995. See 60 FR 22156,
22177 (May 4, 1995). This ANPR marks
the beginning of our assessment of the
effectiveness of the regulations in
achieving their original goals of (1)
emphasizing in examinations an
institution’s actual performance in,
rather than its process for, addressing
CRA responsibilities; (2) promoting
consistency in evaluations; and (3)
eliminating unnecessary burden. Any
regulatory changes that we determine to
be necessary to improve the regulations’
effectiveness will be made in a
rulemaking after completion of this
review.
With our initiation of this
comprehensive review of the
regulations, we seek to determine
whether, and if so, how, the regulations
should be amended to better evaluate
financial institutions’ performance
under the CRA, consistent with the
authority, mandate, and intent of the
statute. We encourage comments from
the industry and the public on all
aspects of this ANPR, as well as other
concerns regarding the regulations that
may not be represented, in order to
ensure a full discussion of the issues.
Background
In 1977, Congress enacted the CRA to
encourage federally insured banks and
thrifts to help meet the credit needs of
their entire communities, including
low-and moderate-income
neighborhoods, consistent with safe and
sound banking practices. 12 U.S.C. 2901
et seq. In the CRA, Congress determined
that:
(1) Regulated financial institutions are
required by law to demonstrate that
their deposit facilities serve the
convenience and needs of the
communities in which they are
chartered to do business;
(2) The convenience and needs of
communities include the need for credit
services as well as deposit services; and
(3) Regulated financial institutions
have continuing and affirmative
obligation[s] to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered. (12 U.S.C.
2901(a).) Further, Congress directed the
agencies to assess an institution’s record
of meeting the credit needs of its entire
community, and to consider that record
when acting on an application for a
deposit facility.
In 1993, we initiated a reform of our
CRA regulations. The goal of the reform
was to develop revised rules that would
clarify how we would evaluate the
performance of the institutions we
supervise. It also was our goal to
develop a new system of evaluating
financial institutions’ records with
respect to CRA that would focus
primarily on objective, performance-
based assessment standards that
minimize compliance burden while
stimulating improved performance.
After holding seven public hearings
and publishing two proposed rules, we
jointly issued final rules (the
‘‘regulations’’) on May 4, 1995 (60 FR
22156). See 12 CFR 25, 228, 345, and
563e, implementing 12 U.S.C. 2901 et
seq. We published related clarifying
documents on December 20, 1995 (60
FR 66048) and May 10, 1996 (61 FR
21362). To assist financial institutions
and the public, we have also provided
interpretive guidance about the
regulations in the form of questions and
answers published in the Federal
Register. See 65 FR 25088 (April 28,
2000).
Under the regulations, the agencies
evaluate a financial institution through
a performance-based examination, the
scope of which is determined by the
institution’s size and business strategy.
Large, retail-oriented institutions are
examined using the lending,
investment, and service tests. Small
institutions are examined using a
streamlined small institution test.
Wholesale and limited purpose
institutions are examined under a
community development test. And,
finally, all institutions have the option
of being evaluated under a strategic
plan. No matter which evaluation
method is used, each institution’s
performance is evaluated in a
‘‘performance context’’ that examiners
factor into their CRA evaluations. The
performance context includes
consideration of factors such as each
institution’s business strategy and
constraints, as well as the needs of, and
opportunities afforded by, the
communities served.
As stated, our goal was to make CRA
examinations more objective and
performance-based. To this end, the
regulations require large institutions to
collect, report, and disclose data on
small business, small farm and
community development loans, as well
as limited data about home mortgage
lending outside metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs), if the institution is subject
to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA).
Issues for Comment
A fundamental issue for consideration
is whether any change to the regulations
would be beneficial or is warranted.
Industry representatives, community
and consumer organization
representatives, members of Congress,
and the public have discussed the
regulations with the agencies over the
years, e.g., during examinations, in the
application process, at conferences, and
at other meetings. Some suggest that the
regulations work reasonably well and
that little or no change is necessary.
Others suggest that more extensive
changes may be needed to reflect the
significant changes in the delivery of
services and expansion of products
offered by financial institutions as a
result of new technologies and financial
modernization legislation. Still others
advise that regulatory changes are
inherently burdensome, so the benefit of
any change should be weighed against
the cost of effecting the change.
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The following discussion identifies
some of the issues that may warrant our
review. The discussion is by no means
exhaustive of all the issues that could be
raised or the viewpoints that could be
expressed. Commenters are invited to
respond to the questions presented and
to offer comments or suggestions on any
other issues related to the CRA
regulations, including developments in
the industry that may impact how we
evaluate CRA performance in the future.
The agencies also welcome suggestions
on what, if any, other steps we might
undertake instead of, or in addition to,
revising the regulations.
1. Large Retail Institutions: Lending,
Investment, and Service Tests
Large retail institutions are subject to
the lending, investment, and service
tests. These tests primarily consider
such things as the number and dollar
amount of loans, qualified investments,
and services, and the location and
recipients of these activities. The tests
also call for qualitative consideration of
an institution’s activities, including
whether, and to what extent, loans,
investments, and services are responsive
to community credit needs; whether and
to what extent they are innovative,
flexible, or complex activities; and, in
the case of investments, the degree to
which the investments are not routinely
provided by private investors. Thus, the
regulations attempt to temper their
reliance on quantitative factors by
requiring examiners to evaluate
qualitative factors, because not all
activities of the same numerical
magnitude have equal impact or entail
the same relative importance when
undertaken by different institutions in
different communities.
Nonetheless, because the tests first
consider the number and dollar amount
of loans, investments, or services, some
are of the opinion that CRA evaluations
have become simply a ‘‘numbers game.’’
They question whether the regulations
strike the right balance between
evaluation of the quantity and quality of
CRA activities. They suggest, for
example, that the regulations provide
too little consideration for an
institution’s focus on smaller projects ‘‘
whether or not ‘‘innovative’’ ‘‘ that are
particularly difficult to carry out, but are
especially meaningful and responsive to
the institution’s community.
Institutions’ CRA ratings reflect the
principle that lending is the primary
vehicle for meeting a community’s
credit needs. In the 1995 preamble to
the regulations, the agencies published
a ratings matrix for examiners to use
when evaluating large retail institutions
under the lending, investment, and
service tests. Under this matrix, it is
impossible for an institution to achieve
a ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating overall unless it
receives at least a ‘‘low satisfactory’’
rating on the lending test. The agencies
continue to use this ratings matrix.
With respect to the emphasis placed
on each category of an institution’s
activities, some question whether
lending should be emphasized more
than investments and services. They
assert that a CRA evaluation should
allow for adjustment of this emphasis in
a manner that more nearly corresponds
with the activities of the institution and
the particular needs of its community.
For example, they assert, if an
institution does not significantly engage
in retail lending and, therefore, makes
few loans, the lending test should not
receive more emphasis than the
investment and service tests for that
institution’s CRA evaluation.
Others contend, however, that lending
should always be stressed, because they
believe that deposits derived from
communities should be reinvested in
those communities through loans. Still
others assert that lending should be the
only basis upon which institutions are
evaluated.
Finally, with respect to the three tests,
some have argued that an institution’s
record of providing services should be
given more emphasis than it currently is
given. Others assert that providing
services is not relevant to assessing
whether an institution is meeting the
credit needs of its community.
• Do the regulations strike the
appropriate balance between
quantitative and qualitative measures,
and among lending, investments, and
services? If so, why? If not, how should
the regulations be revised?
A. Lending test. The agencies evaluate
an institution’s lending performance by
considering the number and amount of
loans originated or purchased by the
institution in its assessment area; the
geographic distribution of its lending;
characteristics, such as income level, of
its borrowers; its community
development lending; and its use of
innovative or flexible lending practices
to address the credit needs of low- or
moderate-income individuals or
geographies in a safe and sound manner.
One aspect of the lending test that
some have raised with the agencies is
that the regulations allow equal
consideration for loan originations and
purchases. Some assert that only loan
originations should be considered in an
institution’s evaluation. Supporters of
this position maintain that
consideration of loan purchases does
not encourage institutions to increase
capital in their communities. Rather,
they believe equal consideration may
prompt institutions to buy and sell the
same loans repeatedly to influence their
CRA ratings. On the other hand, some
contend that loan purchases free up
capital to the selling institution, thus
enabling it to make additional loans.
Still others argue that both purchases
and originations should be considered,
but originations should be weighted
more heavily because they require more
involvement by the institution with the
borrower.
A related issue focuses on how the
agencies should treat secondary market
activity. The regulations currently
capture purchased loans under the
lending test and purchased asset-backed
securities under the investment test.
Some find this distinction to be
artificial, and propose that purchased
loans and purchased asset-backed
securities should be captured under the
same test, although they differ on which
test should be used.
In addition, some are concerned that
the regulations generally seem to
provide consideration of loans without
regard to whether the lending activities
are appropriate. They recommend that a
CRA examination also should include
consideration of whether certain loans
contain harmful or abusive terms and,
therefore, do not help to meet
community credit needs.
• Does the lending test effectively
assess an institution’s record of helping
to meet the credit needs of its entire
community? If so, why? If not, how
should the regulations be revised?
B. Investment test. The agencies
evaluate large retail institutions’
performance under the investment test
based on the dollar amount of qualified
investments, their innovativeness or
complexity, their responsiveness to
credit and community development
needs, and the degree to which they are
not routinely provided by private
investors. The agencies included the
investment test in CRA evaluations in
recognition that investments, as well as
loans, can help meet credit needs.
With respect to whether it is
appropriate to evaluate institutions’
investment activities, some suggest that
investments by financial institutions are
invaluable in helping to meet the credit
needs of the institutions’ communities,
particularly in low- and moderate-
income areas. Still others assert that the
agencies should only consider
investment activities to augment
institutions’ CRA ratings. In their view,
although investments may help an
institution to meet the credit needs of its
community, particularly in low- and
moderate-income areas, CRA ratings
should be based primarily on lending
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activity. Others state, however, that it is
inappropriate for the agencies to
evaluate investments under the CRA as
a means of meeting credit needs.
The availability of qualified
investments has also been an issue of
concern to some. Although some have
observed that since the regulations went
into effect, the market of available CRA-
related investments has grown and
continues to grow, others assert that
appropriate investment opportunities
may not be available in their
communities. Further, some of the retail
institutions subject to the investment
test have indicated that, in some cases,
it has been difficult to compete for
investment opportunities, particularly
against much larger institutions.
In addition, some have raised
concerns that the innovative and
complex elements of the investment test
lead to a constant demand to change
programs, even where existing programs
are successful, just to maximize CRA
consideration. Others have asked the
agencies to reduce the uncertainty of
how investments will be evaluated in an
examination.
• Does the investment test effectively
assess an institution’s record of helping
to meet the credit needs of its entire
community? If so, why? If not, how
should the regulations be revised?
C. Service test. Under the service test,
the agencies consider an institution’s
branch distribution among geographies
of different income levels, its record of
opening and closing branches,
particularly in low- and moderate-
income geographies, the availability and
effectiveness of alternative systems for
delivering retail banking services in
low- and moderate-income geographies
and to low- and moderate-income
individuals, and the range of services
provided in geographies of all income
levels, as well as the extent to which
those services are tailored to meet the
needs of those geographies. The
agencies also consider the extent to
which the institution provides
community development services and
the innovativeness and responsiveness
of those community development
services.
The criteria for evaluating retail
services have led to discussion on the
test’s effectiveness. Some argue that the
service test depends too heavily on the
provision of brick and mortar banking
services, particularly when one
considers that many services are now
provided by telephone, mail or
electronically. Others assert that brick
and mortar banking facilities should be
weighted heavily because they are
necessary, especially in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods where
consumers may not have access to
electronic banking services. These
issues have led some to propose that the
evaluation should consider not only the
delivery method and type of service, but
also the effectiveness of the delivery
method, i.e., the extent to which low-
and moderate-income persons actually
use the services offered. In addition,
some have suggested that the test should
provide more consideration for flexible
and innovative deposit accounts.
As for community development
services, such as providing technical
assistance on financial matters to
nonprofit organizations serving low-
and moderate-income housing needs,
some suggest that these services are not
given adequate consideration. In
particular, they state that community
development services are often a critical
component of delivering or supporting
activities considered under the lending
test. Some also argue, however, that
there is no incentive for an institution
to engage in what might be labor
intensive endeavors because community
development services are only a small
component of its overall evaluation.
Others suggest that community
development services should be
evaluated within the context of other
community development activities,
such as lending and investments,
because evaluating them separately
could result in artificial designations
and may not give adequate
consideration to the integral
relationship among the activities. Still
others suggest that the community
development and retail services
components should be combined. See
related discussion in 1.D.
• Does the service test effectively
assess an institution’s record of helping
to meet the credit needs of its entire
community? If so, why? If not, how
should the regulations be revised?
D. Community development activities
of large retail institutions. Under the
regulations, ‘‘community development’’
means affordable housing (including
multifamily rental housing) for low- or
moderate-income individuals;
community services targeted to low- or
moderate-income individuals; activities
that promote economic development by
financing small businesses and farms;
and activities that revitalize or stabilize
low- or moderate-income geographies.
The definition of ‘‘community
development’’ has spurred discussion
since the regulations were published.
Some assert that the definition of
‘‘community development’’ is not broad
enough to cover the full range of
activities that should receive favorable
consideration. For example, some
indicate that many projects intended to
revitalize or stabilize rural communities
do not qualify under the current
regulatory definition of community
development because they are not
located in low- or moderate-income
geographies, as defined in the
regulations. Others assert that the
definition does not adequately value
activities benefiting communities or
projects involving persons with a mix of
incomes.
Issues also have arisen with respect to
the geographic location of an
institution’s community development
activities. For large retail institutions,
the agencies consider community
development activities in their
assessment areas or a broader statewide
or regional area that includes their
assessment areas. Some suggest that
large retail institutions should receive
full consideration for community
development activities anywhere they
are conducted, as long as the
institutions have adequately addressed
the needs of their assessment areas.
They contend that such consideration
should be similar to the consideration of
community development activities
given wholesale and limited purpose
institutions that are evaluated under the
community development test. Others
express concern, however, that if retail
institutions are given the opportunity to
receive consideration for community
development activities outside their
assessment areas and the broader
statewide or regional areas that include
their assessment areas, such an
opportunity may be interpreted as a
requirement to serve these areas. Still
others argue that allowing activities
further afield to receive consideration
would diminish institutions’ incentives
to serve their own communities.
As discussed above, the community
development loans, qualified
investments, and community
development services of large retail
institutions are considered separately
under the lending, investment, and
service tests, respectively. Some suggest
this evaluation method leads
institutions to be overly concerned with
whether they have ‘‘enough’’ of each
activity. They argue that all community
development activities, whether loans,
investments or services, should be
evaluated in one separate test, rather
than in the existing three tests. Under
such a test, an institution would receive
consideration for community
development loans, investments, and
services needed in its community, based
on the opportunities that exist and the
ability of the institution to respond.
• Are the definitions of ‘‘community
development’’ and related terms
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appropriate? If so, why? If not, how
should the regulations be changed?
• Are the provisions relating to
community development activities by
institutions that are subject to the
lending, investment, and service tests
effective in assessing those institutions’
performance in helping to meet the
credit needs of their entire
communities? If so, why? If not, how
should the regulations be revised?
2. Small Institutions: The Streamlined
Small Institution Evaluation
A ‘‘small institution’’ is defined as an
institution with total assets of less than
$250 million that is independent or is
affiliated with a holding company with
total bank and thrift assets of less than
$1 billion as of the two preceding year
ends. Some suggest that the asset
thresholds for being considered a small
institution are too low. Others assert
that holding company assets are
irrelevant—if a bank has less than $250
million in assets, it should be
considered small even if it is affiliated
with a large holding company. Still
others suggest that holding company
assets are relevant only if the holding
company provides support for CRA
activities or otherwise directs the CRA
activities of an institution.
Small institutions are evaluated under
a streamlined test that focuses primarily
on lending. When evaluating a small
institution, an agency considers its loan-
to-deposit ratio; the percentage of loans
in its assessment areas; its record of
lending to borrowers of different income
levels and businesses and farms of
different sizes; the geographic
distribution of its loans; and its record
of taking action, if warranted, in
response to written complaints about its
performance in helping to meet credit
needs in its assessment area(s).
The small institution performance
standards generally have been favorably
received. Some, however, express
concerns that the small institution
assessment method does not provide for
adequate consideration of non-lending-
related investments, retail-related
services, or community development
services. Others assert that the small
institution performance standards do
not adequately consider the activities
small institutions are performing in
their communities, particularly in
highly competitive markets. Others say
that the standards do not create a
sufficient incentive for small
institutions to seek out and make
investments, provide new services, or
strive for higher ratings. Some also
argue that institutions evaluated under
the streamlined method should not be
eligible for an ‘‘outstanding’’ rating
based on their lending activities alone—
that a small institution should be
engaged in making investments and
providing services in order to receive a
rating higher than satisfactory.
• Do the provisions relating to asset
size and holding company affiliation
provide a reasonable and sufficient
standard for defining ‘‘small
institutions’’ that are eligible for the
streamlined small institution evaluation
test? If so, why? If not, how should the
regulations be revised?
• Are the small institution
performance standards effective in
evaluating such institutions’ CRA
performance? If so, why? If not, how
should the regulations be revised?
3. Limited Purpose and Wholesale
Institutions: The Community
Development Test
The community development test is
the evaluation method used for limited
purpose and wholesale institutions. A
limited purpose institution offers only a
narrow product line (such as credit card
or motor vehicle loans) to a regional or
broader market and must request and
receive designation as a limited purpose
institution from its regulatory agency. A
wholesale institution is not in the
business of extending home mortgage,
small business, small farm, or consumer
loans to retail customers, and similarly
must obtain a designation as a
wholesale institution.
Some question whether the
definitions of limited purpose and
wholesale institutions are appropriate.
For example, they ask whether the
definition of limited purpose should be
expanded to a limited extent to capture
retail institutions that offer more than a
narrow product line on a regional or
national basis.
Under the community development
test, the agencies consider the number
and amount of community development
loans, qualified investments, or
community development services; the
use of innovative or complex qualified
investments, community development
loans, or community development
services and the extent to which the
investments are not routinely provided
by private investors; and the
institution’s responsiveness to credit
and community development needs.
Wholesale and limited purpose
institutions may receive consideration
for community development activities
outside of their assessment areas (or a
broader statewide or regional area that
includes their assessment areas) as long
as they have adequately addressed the
needs of their assessment areas.
Some question whether the
community development test for
wholesale and limited purpose
institutions is as rigorous as the lending,
investment, and service tests are for
large retail institutions. Others suggest
that the community development test
may be an appropriate test not only for
limited purpose and wholesale
institutions, but also for other types of
institutions, such as branchless
institutions that provide a broad range
of retail services nationwide by
telephone, mail, or electronically. Still
others assert that the community
development test may be an appropriate
test for any retail institution.
• Are the definitions of ‘‘wholesale
institutions’’ and ‘‘limited purpose
institution’’ appropriate? If so, why? If
not, how should the regulations be
revised?
• Does the community development
test provide a reasonable and sufficient
standard for assessing wholesale and
limited purpose institutions? If so, why?
If not, how should the regulations be
revised?
• Would the community development
test provide a reasonable and sufficient
standard for assessing the CRA record of
other insured depository institutions,
including retail institutions? If so, why
and which ones, and how should the
regulations be revised? If not, why not?
4. Strategic Plan
The agencies developed the strategic
plan option to provide institutions with
more flexibility and certainty regarding
what aspects of their performance will
be evaluated and what quantitative and
qualitative measures will be applied. To
exercise this option, an institution must
informally seek suggestions from the
public while developing its plan, solicit
formal public comment on its plan, and
submit the plan to its regulatory agency
(along with any written comments
received from the public and an
explanation of any changes made to the
plan in response to those public
comments).
To be approved by an agency, a CRA
strategic plan must have measurable
goals and address how the institution
plans to meet the credit needs of its
assessment area, in particular, low- and
moderate-income geographies and
individuals, through lending,
investments, and services, as
appropriate. Although strategic plans
should generally emphasize lending
goals, the rule allows institutions the
flexibility to choose a different
emphasis, as necessary, given their
business strategy and the needs of their
community.
Strategic plans must contain goals
that, if met, would constitute
‘‘satisfactory’’ performance. An
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institution may also include goals that
would constitute ‘‘outstanding’’
performance. Upon examination, an
institution that substantially achieves its
goals under its approved plan will
receive the rating attributed to those
goals in its plan.
Only a few institutions have used the
strategic plan option. These institutions
indicate that they prefer the certainty
provided by having a strategic plan. On
the other hand, others have said that
they have chosen not to pursue this
option because of concern about the
public nature of the process and the
plan itself, including concern that their
competitors might obtain information
about their business strategy. Some
indicate that they have found it difficult
to develop a strategic plan with
measurable goals. These concerns have
led some to suggest that the strategic
plan option should be reformed, while
others suggest that it should be
eliminated.
Some suggest that a strategic plan
allows non-traditional institutions, such
as institutions that provide a wide range
of products nationwide via the Internet
or through other non-branch-based
delivery systems, to set performance
goals that better reflect the markets they
serve. Some suggest that a strategic plan
should be mandatory for certain non-
traditional institutions, particularly an
institution for which the vast majority of
retail lending activity occurs outside of
its assessment area as defined by the
regulation. Others suggest that the
strategic plan option could be used to
blend existing assessment methods for
different business lines within one
institution, for example, in the context
of a bank with a retail branch network
in one part of the country and wholesale
operations in another, or an Internet
presence nationally.
• Does the strategic plan option
provide an effective alternative method
of evaluation for financial institutions?
If so, why? If not, how should the
regulations be revised?
5. Performance Context
The regulations provide that an
institution’s performance under the tests
and standards is evaluated in the
context of information about the
institution, its community, its
competitors, and its peers. Such
information may include, among other
things, demographic data about the
institution’s assessment areas; the
institution’s product offerings and
business strategy; lending, investment,
and service opportunities in its
assessment areas; any institutional
capacity and constraints; and
information about the institution’s past
performance and the performance of
similarly situated lenders.
Some assert that performance context
provides a means to evaluate the
qualitative impact of an institution’s
activities in a community, striking the
right balance between the quantity and
quality of an institution’s activity. The
appropriate information helps to assess
the responsiveness of an institution’s
activities to community credit needs.
Performance context may also provide
insight into whether an activity
involving a lower dollar amount could
meet community needs to a greater
extent than an activity with a higher
dollar amount, but with less innovation,
complexity, or impact on the
community.
Others assert that consideration of a
performance context may create
uncertainty about what activities will be
considered and how they will be
weighted during a CRA examination.
They contend that more specific and
quantifiable measures are needed to
understand CRA evaluations more fully,
despite the quantitative and qualitative
factors outlined in the regulations and
interagency guidance.
On the other hand, others have raised
concerns that prescribing performance
ratios for institutions would result in
rigid performance requirements, and
thereby eliminate the advantages of a
performance context analysis. They
maintain that the performance context
provides examiners with the latitude
needed to conduct a meaningful
evaluation. They contend this latitude is
important given the different types of
institutions and communities, and the
wide variety of business, market,
economic, and other factors that can
affect an institution’s ability to respond
to community credit needs.
• Are the provisions on performance
context effective in appropriately
shaping the quantitative and qualitative
evaluation of an institution’s record of
helping to meet the credit needs of its
entire community? If so, why? If not,
how should the regulations be revised?
6. Assessment Areas
The regulations contain guidelines for
institutions to use in defining their
assessment areas. The assessment area is
the geographic area in which the
agencies will evaluate an institution’s
record of meeting the credit needs of its
community. The regulations provide
that an institution’s assessment area
should consist generally of one or more
metropolitan statistical areas or one or
more contiguous political subdivisions,
and include geographies where the
institution has its main office, branches,
and deposit-taking ATMs, as well as
surrounding geographies where the
institution has originated or purchased
a substantial portion of its loans. An
institution may adjust the boundaries of
its assessment area to include only the
portion of a political subdivision that it
can reasonably expect to serve.
However, an institution’s assessment
area may not reflect illegal
discrimination and may not arbitrarily
exclude low- or moderate-income
geographies, taking into account the
institution’s size and financial
condition.
Some indicate that the assessment
area delineation in the regulations has
proven appropriate for most
institutions. They assert that assessment
areas are appropriately limited to the
geographic areas around an institution’s
main office, branches, and deposit-
taking ATMs. They contend that this is
an appropriate and practical way to give
focus to an institution’s responsibility to
help meet the credit needs of its
community. Further, they contend that
an institution is most familiar with the
areas in which it is physically located
and is in the best position to help meet
credit needs in those areas. Still others
are concerned about setting expectations
on where institutions should be
conducting their business if assessment
areas were to include areas in which the
institutions are not physically located.
On the other hand, some assert that
the regulations’ designation of
assessment areas ‘‘ based upon the
location of the main office, branches,
and deposit-taking ATMs of an
institution—ignores a variety of deposit
acquisition and credit distribution
channels used by an increasing number
of institutions to serve the retail public,
often reaching widely dispersed
markets. They argue that these channels
should be considered part of an
institution’s ‘‘community.’’ Others
suggest that the regulations’ approach to
assessment area may create a
disincentive for institutions to engage in
community development activities in
low- and moderate-income communities
and rural areas where they have no
physical presence and which are not
part of their assessment areas.
To address these and other concerns,
some recommend that institutions be
required to delineate geographically
defined assessment areas wherever they
deliver retail banking services, whether
or not they have physical deposit-
gathering branches or ATMs in each
locale. Others suggest that the
assessment area should not be limited to
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs),
but that the regulations should allow
statewide and even national assessment
areas. Some others suggest that
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assessment areas without a geographical
delimitation should be allowed, such as
one based on a type of customer—
similar to the way an institution that
predominantly serves military
personnel is permitted by the statute to
delineate its entire deposit customer
base as its assessment area. Finally,
some propose that the agencies should
create a distinct evaluation method with
respect to the assessment area for
institutions that gather deposits and
deliver products and services without
using deposit-taking branches or ATMs,
for example, those institutions that use
the Internet almost exclusively to gather
deposits and deliver products.
• Do the provisions on assessment
areas, which are tied to geographies
surrounding physical deposit-gathering
facilities, provide a reasonable and
sufficient standard for designating the
communities within which the
institution’s activities will be evaluated
during an examination? If so, why? If
not, how should the regulations be
revised?
7. Activities of Affiliates
Under the lending, investment, and
service tests and the community
development test, an institution may
elect to have activities of its affiliates
considered as part of its own record of
performance. An ‘‘affiliate’’ is defined as
any company that controls, is controlled
by, or is under common control with
another company. Subsidiaries of
financial institutions are considered
affiliates under this definition.
Some assert that activities of affiliates,
and in particular, subsidiaries of a
financial institution, should always be
considered in an institution’s CRA
evaluation. They contend that, because
the regulations provide for
consideration of affiliates’ activities
only at an institution’s option, some
institutions may book loans, make
investments, and provide services for
low- and moderate-income persons
primarily in the institution, while
offering other products and services
more predominantly targeted to middle-
and upper-income persons in their
affiliates or by lending through
consortia. Thus, they argue, institutions
may be using their affiliates’ activities to
manipulate their CRA ratings. Others
contend that if institutions can opt for
consideration of affiliates’ activities to
enhance their CRA performance, their
CRA performance should also be
affected if their affiliates engage in
abusive lending activities.
Others suggest that affiliate activities
should be required to have a direct
impact on an institution’s assessment
area. Still others assert that only the
activities of an insured depository
institution should be considered in its
CRA evaluation. Affiliate activities
should be irrelevant, they argue, when
rating an institution’s CRA performance
and should not be considered, even at
the option of the institution. On the
other hand, others have indicated that
the current treatment of affiliate
activities is appropriate because the
CRA applies only to insured depository
institutions.
• Are the provisions on affiliate
activities, which permit consideration of
an institution’s affiliates’ activities at
the option of the institution, effective in
evaluating the performance of the
institution in helping to meet the credit
needs of its entire community, and
consistent with the CRA statute? If so,
why? If not, how should the regulations
be revised?
8. Data Collection and Maintenance of
Public Files
The regulations require large
institutions to collect and report data on
small business, small farm and
community development lending, as
well as limited data about home
mortgage lending outside MSAs, if the
institutions are subject to HMDA. The
data requirements were designed to
avoid undue data collection, reporting,
and disclosure burden by: (1)
Conforming data requirements to the
extent possible with data already
collected under HMDA, call reports, and
thrift financial reports; (2) limiting data
reporting to large institutions; and (3)
making reporting of certain types of data
optional.
Some question the agencies’ authority
to require collection and reporting of
data under the CRA regulations. Others
express concerns about the limitations
of the data collected and reported. For
example, small business and small farm
data are aggregated at the census tract
level, while community development
loans are aggregated at the institution
level. Still others question whether the
collected and reported data are
sufficiently detailed to be of use. Some
also suggest that investment data, as
well as data on lending, are necessary to
properly evaluate institutions’
performance under CRA.
Some indicate that collection of the
required data and maintenance of a
public file is burdensome and that very
few interested parties ask to see the
public files. However, others assert that
institutions’ public files provide
valuable information for the public to
use to monitor the extent to which they
serve their communities.
• Are the data collection and
reporting and public file requirements
effective and efficient approaches for
assessing an institution’s CRA
performance while minimizing burden?
If so, why? If not, how should the
regulations be revised?
Conclusion
With this ANPR, we seek input to
assist us in determining whether and, if
so, how the CRA regulations should be
revised. We welcome comments on all
aspects of the CRA regulations and
encourage all interested parties to
provide their views. Hearing from
parties with diverse viewpoints will
help us to determine the most
appropriate way to approach the review
of the regulations.
Executive Order 12866
OCC and OTS: The agencies do not
know now whether they will propose
changes to the CRA rules and, if so,
whether these changes will constitute a
significant regulatory action under the
Executive Order. This ANPR neither
establishes nor proposes any regulatory
requirements. OCC and OTS have
submitted a notice of planned regulatory
action to OMB for review. Because this
ANPR does not contain a specific
proposal, information is not available
with which to prepare an economic
analysis. OCC and OTS will prepare a
preliminary analysis if they proceed
with a proposed rule that constitutes a
significant regulatory action.
Accordingly, we solicit comment,
information, and data on the potential
effects on the economy of any changes
to the CRA rule that the commenter may
recommend. We will carefully consider
the costs and benefits associated with
this rulemaking.
Dated: July 11, 2001.
John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller of the Currency.
Dated: July 12, 2001.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.




Dated: July 10, 2001.
Ellen Seidman,
Director, Office of Thrift Supervision.
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